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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3(a) confers jurisdiction on this appellate court 
to decide this appeal from a district court in a civil matter. A notice of appeal was timely 
filed on November 29, 1999.1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Should the trial court have granted Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment? 
Denial of summary judgment is reviewed by the appellate court under a "de novo" 
standard, with no deference given to the trial court. Brown v. Weiss. 871 P.2d 552, 559 
(UtahApp. 1997).2 
Issue No. 2: Did the trial judge err in denying Defendants' Motion in Limine? 
Most of the motion in limine ruling will be reviewed under an "abuse of 
discretion" standard. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239 (Utah 1992). The rulings on 
II(I) and II(J), which are legal rulings, are reviewed under a "correctness" standard. State 
v. Snvder, 932 P.2d 120, 125 (Utah App. 1997).3 
Issue No. 3: Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the jury on (1) caveat 
1
 See Addendum, tab H, for copy of notice of appeal. 
2
 Defendant's motion for summary judgment and the trial court's oral denial of 
Defendant's motion (preserving the issue) are found in the Addendum, under tab "A". 
3
 Copies of the relevant motions in limine, and the Court's oral ruling (thus 
preserving the issue), are found in the Addendum, under tab "B". 
1 
emptor and (2) knowledge at the time of entering a warranty (Defendants' Proposed 
Instructions D-1 (later referred to as Instruction 37), and D-2 (later referred to as the 
warranty instruction))? 
Rulings on jury instructions are reviewed are reviewed under a "correctness" 
standard. Sumerill v. Shipley. 890 P.2d 1042, 1043 (Utah App. 1995).4 
Issue No. 4: Did the Court err in granting an award of attorneys fees to Plaintiff? 
Because this is a legal question, the Court's ruling is reviewed for "correctness". 
SummerilL 890 P.2d at 1043.5 
Issue No. 5: Did the trial court err in the amount of attorneys fees and costs that it 
awarded to Plaintiffs? 
The standard of review for attorneys fees awards is "abuse of discretion". Foote v. 
Clark. 962 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1998).6 
Issue No. 6: Is the jury verdict awarding damages of $5000 to John Covey against 
Linda Hatch supported by the evidence? 
This issue was preserved in the motion for a directed verdict and for JNOV 
discussed below in Issue 8. A jury verdict is reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" 
4
 Copies of the jury instructions at issue, and the Court's ruling (thus preserving 
the issue), are found in the Addendum under tab "C". 
5
 A copy of the Court's ruling is found in the Addendum under tab "D" 
(preserving the issue). 
6
 The Court's ruling on the amount of attorneys fees is found in the Addendum 
under tab "E" (preserving the issue). 
2 
standard. Bundv v. Century Equip. Co.. 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984). 
Issue No. 7: Is the jury verdict awarding damages of $9,792.00 against Guy Hatch 
for real estate agency violations supported by the evidence? 
This issue was preserved in the motion for a directed verdict and JNOV discussed 
in Issue 8, below. A jury verdict is reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard. 
Bundv v. Century Equip. Co.. 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984). 
Issue No. 8: Did the trial err in denying Defendants' Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict, or, in the Alternative, For a New Trial? 
Defendants moved for a directed verdict during trial, and for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict after the trial (or in the alternative, for a new trial on certain 
matters) based on (1) the issues of insufficient evidence as set forth in Issues 6 and 7, 
above; (2) the issue of caveat emptor (as set forth above in previous issues). Defendants 
had made a motion for a directed verdict during trial (which was never ruled upon) as set 
forth in the trial transcript in Volume III, Page 719, lines 10-12.7 The standard of review 
for these motions is "if viewing evidence in the a light most favorable to prevailing party, 
a court concludes evidence is insufficient to support the verdict." Seale v. Gowens. 923 
P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah 1996). The legal decision would be reviewed for "correctness". 
Summerill, 890 P.2d at 1043. Alternatively, a party is entitled to a new trial where there 
is insufficient evidence "to justify the verdict" or, the verdict is "against the law." URCP 
7
 The JNOV motion and order are found in the Addendum, tab G. 
3 
59(a)(7); Braithwaite v. West Valley City Corp.. 921 P.2d 997, 1001 (Utah 1996). 
Issue No. 9: Did the trial court err in not allowing Defendant Guy Hatch to testify 
about whether the winter when they had resided in the house was cold or whether there 
was snow on the ground? 
This issue was preserved at Volume IV of the trial transcript, pages 933 (line 25) 
to 934 (lines 1-4), where the trial court sustained Plaintiffs' objection which prohibited 
Mr. Hatch to testify as to whether it was a cold winter or not. This is reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239 (Utah 1992). 
Issue No. 10: Did the trial court err in not allowing Exhibit 56 E, an enlargement 
of a photograph offered and entered by Plaintiffs, to be admitted into evidence by 
Defendants? 
This issue was preserved in Volume IV of the trial transcript, at page 944, lines 7-
13, where no objection was even made by the Plaintiffs in regard to Defendants' 
proposed exhibit, yet the trial judge "sustained the duplicative objection". This is re-
viewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 239. 
Issue No. 11: Did the trial court err in not allowing Defendants re-direct 
examination of Guy Hatch? 
This issue is preserved in Volume IV, page 999 of the trial transcript, at lines 21-
25, where the Plaintiffs' attorney had just finished a twenty question re-cross of the 
witness. Defendants' attorney stood and ask for re-direct, and was denied the 
opportunity. This is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Hamilton, 
4 
827 P.2d at 239). 
Issue No. 12: Did the trial court err in not allowing Mr. Hatch to testify as to his 
personal observations of the clothing his children wore in the allegedly cold basement? 
This issue was preserved in Volume IV, pages 1016 (lines 20-25) to page 1017 
(line 1), where the trial court sustained a "duplicative" objection. 
This issue is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Hamilton, 
827 P.2d 232, 239 (Utah 1992). 
Issue No. 13: Did the trial court err in excluding Exhibit 66, a video demonstrating 
that the house was not cold? 
This issue was preserved at Volume III, page 629 (lines 23-25) to page 630 (lines 
1-3) where the trial court sustained Plaintiffs objection to this piece of evidence. 
This issue is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Hamilton, 
827 P.2d 232, 239 (Utah 1992). 
Issue No. 14: Did the trial court err in allowing Plaintiff to ask questions on 
redirect outside the scope of cross examination? 
This issue was preserved in Volume III, page 712, lines 12-18, where Plaintiff 
Michael Morris is being examined on re-direct. 
This issue is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Hamilton, 
827 P.2d 232, 239 (Utah 1992). 
Issue No. 15: Did the trial court err in allowing the complete bank records 
relating to the draws on the construction account to be entered in evidence? 
5 
This objection is preserved at Volume II, page 275, of the transcript. 
This issue is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Hamilton, 
827 P.2d 232, 239 (Utah 1992). 
Issue No. 16: Did the trial court err in allowing the heating contractor who 
installed the HVAC system in the house at issue in the lawsuit testify about his "feelings 
about the occupant of the home as [he] drove by"? 
This issue is preserved in Volume II of the trial transcript, at pages 342-43. This is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 239. 
Issue No. 17: Did the trial court err in allowing Plaintiffs architectural expert to 
testify about the nature of the crack in a wall (turret)? 
This issue is found and preserved Volume II, page 436, lines 2-5, and in Volume II 
of the trial transcript, page 438 and 439. This is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 239. 
Issue No. 18: Did the trial court err in allowing Christopher Miller to render expert 
plumbing testimony? 
This issue is found and preserved at Volume II, page 445, lines 21-22, later at page 
447 and at page 459. This is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 239. 
Issue No. 19: Did the court err in prohibiting the introduction of the Hatch offer to 
purchase the house before trial for $463,000.00? 
This issue is preserved in Volume 1 of the trial transcript, pages 129-133. This is 
6 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d at 239. 
Issue No. 20: Did the cumulative effect of all the above-cited errors create a 
situation where a fair trial could not and did not take place before the trial court? 
This issue is preserved in each of the places mentioned in the previous 19 issues. 
The legal decision would be reviewed for "correctness". Summerill 890 P.2d at 
1043. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, ETC. WHOSE DETERMINATION 
IS DETERMINATIVE OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
No special interpretation of any particular law is of any significance in this, other 
than routine arguments from established precedent and rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs in the District Court action sued the previous owners and the builder of a 
house in Alpine, Utah for breach of warranty, fraud, etc. Plaintiffs alleged that the house 
was defective in various ways, some arising before the sale and some after. Plaintiffs 
also alleged breach of a "side" agreement concerning some improvements that were to be 
made, and claimed against the realtor Defendant whom they claimed violated professional 
standards. Plaintiffs sought damages in excess of $200,000.00, but were awarded only 
$57,000 by the jury. In post-trial proceedings, however, plaintiffs were additionally 
awarded over $60,000 in attorneys fees and costs. Defendants have appealed (1) denial 
of Defendants' motion for summary judgment; (2) denial of Defendants' motions in 
limine and jury instructions; (3) various evidentiary rulings; and (4) denial of certain 
post-trial motions and rulings (i.e. attorneys fees issues. JNOV, etc.). 
7 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs Michael and Elizabeth Morris purchased a house in the Fall of 1995 
from Defendants Dan and Cynthia Parkinson. Trial Transcript, Vol. I, p. 22. In the 
purchase and sale documents, the Parkinsons provided a written warranty as follows: 
"Seller warrants all workmanship, habitability, systems of all kinds, and roof for period of 
two years." Trial exhibit 1. This warranty, as well as the entire purchase and sale 
contract, was prepared by the Plaintiffs attorney, Mark Morris. Transcript, Vol. I, p. 
107-08. 
At the time the Plaintiffs purchased the house in question, they were aware of and 
observed many items in the house that they did not like, intended to repair, or thought 
were defective, such as shoddy or non-existent "base trim in the kitchen and kitchen 
cabinets," "the poor quality of all visible finish work," the existence of only one furnace 
and air conditioning unit at the house, the door construction style, the circular stairway's 
precarious rail, the slope of the lot, etc. Transcript, Vol. I, p. 126-129.8 Defendants 
further acknowledged that they has perceived problems with the following items before 
purchasing the house:9 the grade and slope of the area behind the house; the condition and 
8Please see also the affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs Michael and Elizabeth 
Morris in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, which detail the 
many defects they were aware of, and are incorporated herein by reference. 
9These items were listed in Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
dated December 15, 1998, at [^9, and in the supporting affidavits are located in the 
Addendum, tab I. 
8 
placement of the window wells; the condition of mesh visible in exterior stucco; the 
condition of the wood flooring; the placement of the handrail on the circular stairway; the 
condition and structure of the interior door frames; the design and size of the HVAC 
system; the condition of the muliion in the den window; the design, size and placement of 
the exterior steps and walkways; the size of the toilets; the size of the interior stairs; the 
condition of the chimney caps; the installed condition of window trim and the stained 
glass window; the condition of wood stair treads; the height of handrails and guardrails; 
the placement of the rear deck; the extent of landscaping around the deck; the absence of 
window stools; the absence of base in the kitchen and kitchen cabinets; the placement and 
number of trees around the house; and the alleged poor quality of all visible finish work. 
Plaintiffs claimed that Defendant Guy Hatch, the builder and occupier of the home 
at the time of purchase, was their real estate agent for the purchase, notwithstanding the 
fact that they did not have a written agreement with him, did not view any other 
properties with him, did not prepare the purchase agreement, never contacted the 
Plaintiffs, and did not pay him a commission. Transcript, Vol. I, p. 111-115. 
At the time of the purchase of the house, Plaintiff John Covey (Elizabeth Morris' 
father) entered into a contract with Defendant Linda Hatch whereby he paid Ms. Hatch 
$25,000, and she was responsible to perform certain services on the house. Transcript, 
Vol. I, p. 47. 
Plaintiffs Michael and Elizabeth Morris became unhappy with the house, and sued 
the Parkinsons for breach of the warranty for various alleged defects and shortcomings in 
9 
the house. They also sued Defendant Hatch for fraud, and later, a few months before 
trial, added a claim against Hatch, claiming he was their real estate agent and that he 
breached his real estate agent responsibilities owed to them. Plaintiff John Covey sued 
Defendant Linda Hatch for breach of her contract with him. See Amended Complaint.10 
Defendants brought a timely motion for partial summary judgment relating to 
issues of warranty and caveat emptor. Their motion was denied. 
Defendants made a motion in limine covering a number of issues, which was also 
denied. Defendants proposed two jury instructions- one regarding warranty and one 
regarding caveat emptor-which were denied.11 
At trial, John Covey testified that he had no idea if any of the items in his contract 
had or had not been completed by Linda Hatch. Transcript, Vol. I, p. 56-57. He testified 
that he did not know if he had been damaged by the Defendants. Id. The jury awarded 
him $5,000 anyway. See Verdict Form in Addendum, tab F. 
At trial, Plaintiffs, in attempting to prove damages on the realtor claims (in the 
form of Defendant Guy Hatch's real estate commission), elicited testimony found in the 
Transcript, Vol. I, page 241, lines 15-21, where Guy Hatch was asked about what his 
personal commission was on the transaction at issue. Mr. Hatch testified at least twice 
10
 Plaintiff John Covey brought his action in his own name, testified in his own 
behalf, and was listed separately on the jury verdict form. His legal action is his own. 
11
 The parties stipulated to 36 jury instructions, all of which were approved by the 
trial court and used with the jury. The two instructions at issue were proposed by 
Defendants and not stipulated to by Plaintiffs. 
10 
that he didn't recall what his commission was. No other evidence was presented on this 
issue. Nonetheless, the jury awarded the Plaintiffs $9,792 in damages. 
A key issue in this case was the condition and adequacy of the heating system of 
the house in question. Defendants had lived in the house through at least one winter. In 
Volume IV of the trial transcript, pages 933 (line 25) to 934 (lines 1-4), the trial court 
sustained an objection which prohibited Mr. Hatch to testify as to whether it was a cold 
winter or not. This fact had not been testified to before by Mr. Hatch. 
Plaintiffs for the first time at trial testified of "cold wind" blowing through alleged 
cracks in the house.12 Defendant then found a rebuttal (and impeachment) exhibit, a 
video of the very room in question, on a snowy, cold Christmas morning. The trial court, 
at Vol. Ill, pp. 629-30, sustained Plaintiffs objection to this piece of evidence which 
completely devastated and contradicted their story that cold wind blew through the house. 
Defendants could in no way have anticipated that Plaintiffs would concoct a story of 
wind blowing through the middle of their house. 
Plaintiffs testified at trial that at the time they purchased the house in question, 
they were aware of and observed many items in the house that they did not like, intended 
12
 This is brought out by Plaintiff Liz Morris during her direct on the first day of 
trial. At Volume I, page 80, lines 13-20 of the trial transcript, she claims "you can feel 
the wind blowing" inside the house, and that "the basement is freezing cold." Plaintiff Liz 
Morris could not get off of this subject. She later testified that "I like to live in a home 
where the wind doesn't blow through the walls." Id., Vol. 1, page 140, lines 12-13. This 
histrionic testimony was not reasonably anticipated, and would have been completely 
destroyed by the video at issue. Hence, Plaintiffs objected with vigor to the video 
evidence, because they had been caught in a gross exaggeration. 
11 
to repair, or thought were not right, such as "base trim in the kitchen and kitchen 
cabinets," "the poor quality of all visible finish work/' the existence of only one furnace 
and air conditioning unit at the house, the door construction style, the circular stairway's 
precarious rail, the lot's slope, etc. Transcript, Vol. I, p. 126-129. See footnote 9, supra. 
Defendants attempted to introduce an enlargement of a very important photograph 
during trial. Transcript, Vol. IV, page 944, lines 7-13 (offered as 56 E). The picture 
would have allowed the jury to better see the details in this picture. This was a trial 
where hundreds of photographic exhibits (including other enlargements) were entered. In 
this case, no objection was even made by the Plaintiffs, yet the trial judge "sustained the 
duplicative objection". Id. 
During the trial, the Plaintiffs' attorney had just finished a twenty question re-
cross of Mr. Hatch. Defendants' attorney stood and ask for re-direct, and was denied the 
opportunity to ask follow-up questions. Transcript, Vol. IV, p. 999. The trial court later 
sustained a "duplicative" objection when Mr. Hatch tried to testify about what his 
children wore in the allegedly cold basement. Mr. Hatch had not previously testified on 
this subject, and it was thus not duplicative. Transcript, Vol. IV, p. 1016-17. 
Later in the trial, Plaintiff Michael Morris was examined on re-direct by his own 
attorney. He is asked about a certificate of occupancy, which was not brought up during 
either direct or cross examination. Defendant objected to the testimony, claiming that the 
answer given was beyond the scope of cross examination, and should not have been 
allowed. The Court denied the objection. Transcript, Vol. Ill, p. 712. 
12 
Plaintiffs continually tried to put before the jury their theory that Defendants had 
built the house and made a large profit, and this was somehow supposed to show that the 
house was defective. Because the court had denied the motion in limine regarding these 
bank records, they had been testified to, and Defendants unsuccessfully tried to keep 
them out of evidence, because the bank records were irrelevant to whether there were 
defects or now, who knew about them, and what it would cost to fix them. Transcript, 
Vol. II, page 275. 
Plaintiffs asked a heating contractor to share his feelings that he had about the 
occupants of the house as he drove by the house in question. Over Defendant's 
objection, he was allowed to vent his "feelings". Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 342-43. 
Plaintiffs called an architect as an expert witness. He was not an engineer. He 
testified during cross examination that he did not know whether a particular crack was 
structural (rather than cosmetic). Transcript, Vol. II, p. 436. Later, on redirect, 
Plaintiffs' attorney attempted to get into the record testimony that the crack might have 
been structural, and Defendants' attorney objected and ask that the testimony be stricken. 
Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 438 and 439. The objection was overruled. Id. 
An important damage issue in the case was the quality and status of the plumbing 
in the house at issue. Plaintiffs called Chris Miller as their plumbing expert. The 
"expert" began reading off of a report prepared by someone else. Defendants' attorney 
objected to the reading of the notes as hearsay, and to his qualifications as an expert. 
Transcript, Vol. II, page 445, lines 21-22. The trial court agreed, and ask for further 
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foundation. Then, instead of offering any more testimony about his qualifications as an 
expert, the witness and Plaintiffs' attorney simply continued his testimony about the 
plumbing in the house. Later, Defendants' attorney again raises the issue of his 
qualifications as a plumber, as no further qualification testimony had been presented. Id. 
at 447. The judge then overrules the objection, and finds Mr. Miller qualified as an 
expert plumber. Id. at 447. It was brought out on cross-examination that Mr. Miller is 
not even a licensed plumber. Id. at 459. 
A month or so before trial, Defendants Hatch had offered to purchase the subject 
house from the Plaintiffs for $463,000.00. It was not a settlement offer, and did not 
mention or reference the litigation at all. The Plaintiffs were claiming over $200,000 
worth of damage, and would have had the opportunity to sell the house at a profit. The 
letter was sent certified mail to the Plaintiffs' house, and they refused not pick it up. It 
was also sent to Plaintiff John Covey, who did in fact receive it and give it to the other 
Plaintiffs. The judge would not allow this letter/offer into evidence. Transcript, Vol. I, 
pp. 129-133 (offer of proof). 
The jury deliberated and returned with a verdict in favor of Defendant Hatch on 
the fraud claims, against Defendants Parkinson an in favor of Plaintiffs Michael and 
Elizabeth Morris in the amount of $42,220.00 on the breach of warranty claim, against 
Defendant Guy Hatch on the realtor claims in the amount of $9,279, and against 
Defendant Linda Hatch and in favor of Plaintiff John Covey in the amount of $5,000.00 
based on the contract between them. See Verdict Form, Addendum, tab F. 
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Defendant brought timely motions for judgment JNOV, asking that the judgments 
against Defendants Hatch be set aside for insufficiency of the evidence, and that the judg-
ment against the Parkinsons be set aside based on the caveat emptor and warranty argu-
ments that had been made in the summary judgment and directed verdict motions by De-
fendants. These motions were denied. See Addendum, tab G (motion and denial order). 
Plaintiffs Morris requested an award of attorneys fees and costs based on the 
attorneys fees clause of the purchase and sale agreement. Defendants Parkinson claimed 
that the clause was abrogated at closing. The Court ruled that attorneys fees should be 
awarded, and then later, after submissions by the attorney for the Plaintiffs, awarded over 
$60,000 in attorney fees. Plaintiffs Morris only recovered $42,200 on their judgment for 
the breach of warranty. See Addendum, tabs D and E. 
Defendants then filed this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Issue No. 1: Should the Judge have granted Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment? 
Plaintiffs admitted in various affidavits filed in this matter that they were aware of 
many of the defects in the house before they purchased the house. Plaintiffs have 
nonetheless asserted claims in tort and for breach of warranty regarding these same items 
that they knew about even as they chose to purchase the house. Utah case law supports 
Defendants' position that a construction warranty does not cover items that a buyer 
knows are defective, but rather items that later become defective. 
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Issue No. 2: Did the trial judge err in denying Defendants' Motion in Limine? 
Defendant filed a lengthy motion in limine according to the schedule set forth in 
the scheduling order of the Court. The motion was denied in full. Some of the evidence 
was later excluded under rulings made at the time, in trial, but other evidence was 
allowed to come into evidence. The Defendant believe the Court erred, then, in two ways 
(1): by improperly denying the motion in limine before trial, the Court forced the 
Defendant to prepare for the cross examination of over 14 persons and entities, and (2) by 
allowing improper evidence to go before the jury. 
Issue No. 3: Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the jury on (1) caveat 
emptor and (2) knowledge at the time of entering a warranty (Defendants' Proposed 
Instructions D-l (later referred to as Instruction 37), and D-2 (later referred to as the 
warranty instruction))? 
Defendants sought jury instructions on (1) caveat emptor, which is the law of the 
land on home purchasing, and (2) buyers' knowledge of defects as a bar to warranty 
claims, as set forth in the motion for partial summary judgment. Both were denied, so no 
instructions on these items were given. These arguments follow the same reasoning set 
forth in the motion in limine and requesting summary judgment. 
Issue No. 4: Did the Court err in granting an award of attorneys fees to Plaintiff? 
The trial court awarded over $60,000 in attorneys fees and costs based on the 
purchase and sale agreement. Defendants assert that the attorneys fees clause of the 
agreement (which is the only possible basis for the award of fees in this case) was 
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abrogated at closing, and that no language would allow that provision to survive closing. 
As such, no fees or costs should have been awarded. There are conflicting cases in this 
area, and Defendants rely on Utah Supreme Court cases such as Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988) and Espinoza v. Safeco Title Insurance Co., 598 P.2d 
346 (Utah 1979). Plaintiffs rely on recent (but contrary) Utah Court of Appeals cases. 
Issue No. 5: Did the trial court err in the amount of attorneys fees and costs that it 
awarded to Plaintiffs? 
Defendants believe that the court was far too generous in the amount of fees and 
costs it awarded to the Plaintiffs. For example, the court awarded almost $1000 for 
Plaintiffs' attorneys to bring a junior attorney down from Salt Lake City to Provo to read 
in a part of a deposition transcript. 
Issue No. 6: Is the jury verdict awarding damages of $5,000 to John Covey against 
Linda Hatch supported by the evidence? 
John Covey testified that he did not whether he had been damaged at all by Linda 
Hatch. If the Plaintiff does not know whether he has been injured, a verdict in favor of 
that Plaintiff is not supported by proper evidence. 
Issue No. 7: Is the jury verdict awarding damages of $9,792.00 against Guy Hatch 
for real estate agency violations supported by the evidence? 
Plaintiffs failed to prove the amount of damages they suffered from any alleged 
real estate agency violations, and thus the jury could only have been speculating. The 
best evidence obtained by Plaintiff was that the witness didn't recall how much he 
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received for his commission. 
Issue No. 8: Did the trial err in denying Defendants' Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict, or, in the Alternative, For a New Trial? 
Defendants moved for a directed verdict during trial, and for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict after the trial (or in the alternative, for a new trial on certain 
matters) based on (1) the issues of insufficient evidence as set forth in Issues 6 and 7, 
above; (2) the issue of caveat emptor (as set forth above, and as set forth in detail in 
accompanying memorandum). This relates to issues 6 and 7, above, and as set forth in 
the motions and accompanying memoranda. 
Issue No. 9: Did the trial court err in not allowing Defendant Guy Hatch to testify 
about whether the winter when they had resided in the house was cold or whether there 
was snow on the ground? 
A key issue in this case was the condition and adequacy of the heating system of 
the house in question. Defendants had lived in the house through at least one winter. 
The trial court sustained an objection which prohibited Mr. Hatch to testify as to whether 
it was a cold winter or not. This was relevant and probative, and had not been testified to 
before by Mr. Hatch. 
Issue No. 10: Did the trial court err in not allowing Exhibit 56 E, an enlargement 
of a picture offered and entered by Plaintiffs, to be admitted into evidence by 
Defendants? 
In this instance, no objection was even made by the Plaintiffs, yet the trial judge 
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"sustained the duplicative objection". The picture would have allowed the jury to better 
see the details in this picture. This was a case where hundreds of photographic exhibits 
(including other enlargements) were entered. The judge had no basis to disallow this 
picture, especially when no objection was raised. 
Issue No. 11: Did the trial court err in not allowing Defendants re-direct 
examination of Guy Hatch? 
During trial, the Plaintiffs' attorney had just finished a 20 question re-cross of the 
witness. Defendants' attorney stood and ask for re-direct, and was denied the 
opportunity. This violates every tenant of fairness and was uncalled for, but followed the 
patter of prejudice against the Defendants. 
Issue No. 12: Did the trial court err in not allowing Mr. Hatch to testify as to his 
personal observations of the clothing his children wore in the allegedly cold basement? 
During the trial, the court sustained a "duplicative" objection when Mr. Hatch 
tried to testify about what his children wore in the allegedly cold basement. Mr. Hatch 
had not previously testified on this subject, and it was thus not duplicative. 
Issue No. 13: Did the trial court err in excluding Exhibit 66, a video demonstrating 
that the house was not cold? 
Plaintiffs for the first time at trial testified of "cold wind" blowing through alleged 
cracks int the house. Defendant then found a rebuttal (and impeachment) exhibit, a video 
of the very room in question, on a snowy, cold Christmas morning. The trial court 
sustained Plaintiffs objection to this piece of evidence which completely devastated and 
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contradicted their story that cold wind blew through the house. The evidence was 
relevant and probative, and proper rebuttal/impeachment evidence 
Issue No. 14: Did the trial court err in allowing Plaintiff to ask questions on 
redirect outside the scope of cross examination? 
During trial, Plaintiff Michael Morris is being examined on re-direct. He is asked 
about a certificate of occupancy, which was not brought up during either direct or cross 
examination. Thus, the answer given was beyond the scope of cross examination, and 
should not have been allowed. 
Issue No. 15: Did the trial court err in allowing the complete bank records 
relating to the draws on the construction account to be entered in evidence? 
Plaintiffs continually tried to put before the jury their theory that Defendants had 
built the house and made a large profit, and this was somehow supposed to show that the 
house was defective. Because the court had denied the motion in limine regarding these 
bank records, they had been testified to, and Defendants tried to keep them out of 
evidence, because the bank records were irrelevant to whether there were defects or now, 
who knew about them, and what it would cost to fix them. This objection should have 
been sustained. 
Issue No. 16: Did the trial court err in allowing the heating contractor who 
installed the HVAC system in the house at issue in the lawsuit testify about his "feelings 
about the occupant of the home as [he] drove by"? 
Plaintiffs asked the contractor to share his feelings that he had about the occupants 
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of the house as he drove by the house in question. His feelings were highly prejudicial, 
and totally irrelevant. 
Issue No. 17: Did the trial court err in allowing Plaintiffs architectural expert to 
testify about the nature of the crack in the turret? 
Plaintiffs called an architect as an expert witness. He was not an engineer. He 
testified during cross examination that he did not know whether a particular crack was 
structural (rather than cosmetic). Later, on redirect, Plaintiffs' attorney attempted to get 
into the record testimony that the crack might have been structural, and Defendants' 
attorney objected and ask that the testimony be stricken. The objection was denied, and 
the testimony was allowed. 
Issue No. 18: Did the trial court err in allowing Christopher Miller to render expert 
plumbing testimony? 
Plaintiffs called Chris Miller as their plumbing expert. The "expert" began reading 
off of a report prepared by someone else. Defendants' attorney objected to the reading of 
the notes as hearsay, and to his qualifications as an expert. The trial court agreed, and ask 
for further foundation. Then, instead of offering any more testimony about his 
qualifications as an expert, the witness and Plaintiffs' attorney simply continued his 
testimony about the plumbing in the house. Defendants' attorney again later raised the 
issue of his qualifications as a plumbing expert. The judge then overruled the objection, 
and finds Mr. Miller qualified as an expert plumber. Mr. Miller is not even a licensed 
plumber. He should not have been qualified as an expert plumber, and his testimony 
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should not have been allowed. 
Issue No. 19: Did the court err in prohibiting the introduction of the Hatch offer to 
purchase the house before trial for $463,000.00? 
A month or so before trial, Defendants Hatch offered to purchase the subject house 
from the Plaintiffs for $463,000.00. It was not a settlement offer, and did not mention or 
reference the litigation at all. The Plaintiffs were claiming over $200,000 worth of 
damage, and would have had the opportunity to sell the house at a profit. The judge 
would not allow this letter/offer into evidence. Defendants contend that the offer was 
highly relevant. 
Issue No. 20: Did the cumulative effect of all the above-cited errors create a 
situation where a fair trial could not and did not take place before the trial court? 
Even if some or even all of the errors alleged in this brief are harmless, their 
cumulative effect was to render it impossible for the Defendants to have a fair trial. 
Some of the alleged errors are more important than others, but added together, there was 
clearly a bias against the Defendants that implicated fairness and due process. 
ARGUMENT 
Issue No. 1: Should the Judge have granted Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment?13 
13Because the appellate court looks at this portion of the appeal in the same 
position as the trial court (i.e. based on the affidavits submitted before trial, and not in 
light of any trial evidence), Appellant hereby incorporates by reference all affidavits and 
briefing done in conjunction with the summary judgment motion. 
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I. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS WHICH ARE NOT COVERED BY THE 
WARRANTIES CONTAINED IN THE AGREEMENT ARE EXPRESSLY 
PRECLUDED BY THE ABROGATION CLAUSE OF THE AGREEMENT 
AND THE DOCTRINE OF MERGER. 
The Morris' claims for breach of contract necessarily rely on the Agreement 
between the parties and the Warranties contained therein. Claims relating to conditions 
of the Property that do not relate to habitability or workmanship of the Property or any 
other item expressly covered by the Warranties are abrogated and merged into the deed. 
The abrogation clause of the Agreement itself and Utah case law firmly establish this 
point. Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1392 (Utah App. 1994). This includes any 
alleged building code violations. Id. 
A. The Warranties Contained in the Agreement are Unambiguous and Are 
Therefore Interpreted as a Matter of Law. 
Interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a matter of law. In R&R Energies v. 
Mother Earth Industries, Inc., the Utah Supreme Court held that "the interpretation of a 
contract is a matter of law for the court to determine unless the contract is ambiguous . . 
." R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Utah 1997). The 
Court continued by pointing out that "[l]anguage in a contract is "ambiguous" when it is 
reasonably capable of being understood in more than one sense." Id. Because the 
warranty terms of the Agreement in the present case are clearly stated and unambiguous, 
the warranties are to be interpreted by the Court as a matter of law. Furthermore, 
inasmuch as the Addendum warranty provision was drafted by Plaintiffs, it will be 
construed against them. 
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B. The Items Set Forth in Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts Are 
Outside of Express Coverage of the Warranties. 
As set forth in the Statement of Facts above, certain alleged defects claimed by 
Plaintiffs were indisputably known prior to the closing. The Buyers both admit that they 
viewed and inspected the Property on several occasions and hired an inspector to 
thoroughly inspect the Property. They noted the alleged defects set forth above and did 
not include such items in the Warranties. They cannot rely on any other alleged warranty 
or representation inasmuch as the Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the 
parties. (Exhibit 1,^14.) Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot recover under breach of contract 
for the items set forth in the Statement of Facts. 
II. ALLEGED DEFECTS THAT WERE KNOWN OR DISCOVERABLE BY 
BUYERS ARE BARRED BY THE AGREEMENT AND THE DOCTRINE 
OF CAVEAT EMPTOR. 
Alleged defects that were known or discoverable by Buyers are barred by the 
Agreement itself and the doctrine of caveat emptor. Utah courts apply the common law 
doctrine of caveat emptor to purchases of existing, previously used homes. Indeed, the 
clear majority of courts nation-wide have deemed it reasonable to hold the purchaser to 
the caveat emptor doctrine in the purchase of used housing. See Utah State Medical 
Assoc, v. Utah State Employees Credit Union. 655 P.2d 643, 645 (Utah, 1982) (the 
doctrine of caveat emptor prevails in the sale of used property). The courts have reasoned 
that because the parties know the article is not new, and the buyer has an opportunity to 
inspect the article, he is placed on the alert for defects which might affect the article's 
24 
quality, condition or fitness. Id. 
Thus, the warranties in the Agreement do not extend to alleged defects that were 
known or discoverable by Michael and Elizabeth Morris (the "Buyers") at the time the 
Agreement was entered into. The items known or discoverable by Plaintiffs are set forth 
in the Statement of Undisputed Facts filed with the summary judgment materials. 
Issue No. 2: Did the trial judge err in denying Defendants' Motion in Limine? 
Defendant filed a lengthy motion in limine according to the schedule set forth in 
the scheduling order of the Court. The motion was denied in full. Some of the evidence 
was later excluded under rulings made at the time, in trial, but other evidence was 
allowed to come into evidence. The Defendant believe the Court erred, then, in two ways 
(1): by improperly denying the motion in limine before trial, the Court forced the 
Defendant to prepare for the cross examination of over 14 persons and entities, and (2) by 
allowing improper evidence to go before the jury. 
Defendants specifically feel that the failure to grant subsections 1(A) and 1(B) were 
error, as far as the witnesses are concerned. Plaintiffs had identified a number of 
witnesses who could not offer any relevant testimony. They were primarily people who 
had previously had disputes with Mr. Hatch, bitter former business partners, etc. They 
clearly had no facts relevant to this case. The court did not grant the motion, and instead 
caused the Defendant to deal with the possibility of their testimony, and to have to 
prepare witnesses to counteract them, all the way through the trial. Although the 
witnesses did not testify, the time and effort that were expended as a result of this motion 
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in limine not being granted was very harmful to Defendants. 
Defendants specifically feel that the failure to grant subsections 11(D), 11(F), 11(G), 
II(I), and II(J) were erroneous. 
In part 11(D) of the motion in limine, the Defendants asked the Court to preclude 
any character evidence relating to the Defendants, because such evidence is generally 
inadmissible. URE 404, 608(a)(b). This opened the door for Plaintiffs' attorney to delve 
into areas that he should not have been allowed to. There was no evidence presented 
which would have allowed negative character evidence or uprior bad acts" to come into 
evidence. 
In parts 11(F) and (G) of the motion in limine, Defendants asked the Court to limit 
the financial testimony regarding overall profit and loss on the house (as opposed to the 
cost of any particular item), and to limit the testimony of unhappy sub-contractor who 
were paid late. Both of these areas of testimony were clearly irrelevant, and potentially 
prejudicial as well. URE 401, 403. 
In parts II(I) and II(J), Defendants sought to eliminate testimony about defects that 
Plaintiffs were aware of when they purchased the house, as well as items for which 
Defendants had no responsibility, that were discovered after the two year warranty period 
had expired. The arguments here are based on the same law and reasoning presented on 
Issue 1, above. Since the Plaintiffs were not entitled to recover for these items, this 
testimony would be irrelevant, and the motion in limine should thus have been granted. 
Issue No. 3: Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the jury on (1) caveat 
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emptor and (2) knowledge at the time of entering a warranty (Defendants' Proposed 
Instructions D-l (later referred to as Instruction 37), and D-2 (later referred to as the 
warranty instruction))? 
As set forth in the argument on Issue 1, caveat emptor applies in all Utah real 
estate cases. Furthermore, as set forth in Issue 1 above, when a party knows about 
particular defects, a warranty will not "retroactively" cover them. 
Defendants proposed two jury instructions (found in the Addendum under tab "C") 
dealing with these areas that were rejected by the trial court. They were extremely 
important, and were part of the heart of Defendants' defense. They should have been 
given to the jury, and it was reversible error not to provide these instructions of basic 
Utah law. 
Issue No. 4: Did the Court err in granting an award of attorneys fees to Plaintiff? 
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES OR COSTS 
UNDER THE REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AGREEMENT. 
A. The Attorney's Fees Provision in the Real Estate Purchase Agreement 
was Abrogated and Does Not Apply to this Action. 
The trial court grossly misinterpreted Utah law as it relates to the abrogation of 
attorney's fees provisions in preliminary real estate agreements. The trial court adopted 
an erroneous of interpretation of this Court's opinion in Maynard v. Wharton proffered 
by Plaintiffs and concluded that Plaintiffs were entitled to their attorney's fees. As shown 
in this section, under applicable Utah law, the attorney's fee provision in this case was 
clearly abrogated. 
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"In Utah, attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by statute or by contract. 
[Citations omitted.] If provided for by contract, the award of attorney fees is allowed only 
in accordance with the contract." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 
1988). 
In this case, the requirements of Dixie State Bank are not met. Although the 
parties' Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC," Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 at trial) contains an 
attorney's fees provision in paragraph 17, the express terms of that provision when read 
in connection with an abrogation provision in the REPC prohibit an award of such costs 
and fees in this case. The abrogation provision states, "Except for the express warranties 
made in this Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after closing." 
(REPC, % 19 (emphasis added).) 
According to the plain meaning of paragraph 19 of the REPC, the only provisions 
of the REPC that apply after closing are "the express warranties made in the Contract." 
The costs and attorney's fees provision is not an express warranty made in the REPC, 
and, therefore it does not apply to actions brought after closing. Because attorney's fees 
are allowed "only in accordance with the contract," Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 988, 
and because the REPC does not accord Plaintiffs their attorney's fees after closing, there 
is no legally cognizable basis for Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys fees. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this exact issue under an almost identical 
contractual and factual scenario in Espinoza v. Safeco Title Insurance Co., 598 P.2d 346 
(Utah 1979). In Espinoza, the plaintiffs purchased real property from the defendants and 
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subsequently brought an action against the defendants and a title company for breach of a 
warranty against encumbrances. The encumbrance was cleared and the defendants 
moved for summary judgment. The plaintiffs acknowledged the encumbrance had been 
cleared but claimed entitlement to attorney's fees in connection with bringing their breach 
of warranty action. Id. at 347. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' claim for attorney 
fees and the plaintiffs appealed. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and held that: 
Plaintiffs contend that [defendants] breached the Earnest Money 
Agreement initially entered into between plaintiffs and [defendants] by 
reason of their failure to convey a clear title. The agreement provides that a 
defaulting party is liable for costs of enforcing the agreement, including 
reasonable attorney's fees. But the agreement contains the standard clause 
by which it became abrogated by execution and delivery of the final 
agreement, that is, the deed and policy of title insurance. 
Attorney's fees are not chargeable to an opposing party generally 
unless there is contractual or statutory liability therefor. There is neither 
here. The terms of the Earnest Money Agreement were merged into the 
deed and extinguished upon delivery thereof. Though the deed contains 
warranties against encumbrances, it does not provide for the payment of 
attorney's fees in an action for damages upon breach of the warranties. 
Id. at 348 (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court's holding in Espinoza reiterates its holding in a previous 
case, Kelsev v. Hansen, 419 P.2d 198 (Utah 1966). In Kdsey, the Court held that a 
provision in an earnest money agreement requiring the buyer to pay extra money for 
drapes in a fourplex was extinguished where the earnest money agreement stated that "it 
is further agreed that execution of the final contract shall abrogate this Earnest Money 
Receipt/' Id. at 198. 
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Espinoza and Kelsey are controlling with respect to this case. In this case (as in 
Espinoza and Kelsey), the parties' agreements contain warranties or promises that survive 
closing, an attorney's fees provision and a standard abrogation clause. Also in this case 
(as in Espinoza and Kelsey), a cause of action for breach of warranty or other promise 
was available to Plaintiffs. Under such facts, the REPC in this case "does not provide for 
payment of attorney's fees in an action for damages upon breach of the warranties" Id.u 
Therefore, Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees must be denied in its entirety.15 And, for 
the same reasons, Plaintiffs' motion for costs under the REPC must also be denied in its 
entirety. 
Plaintiffs may argue that a contrary result is reached in Stubbs v. Hemmert 576 
P.2d 168 (Utah 1977) and Mavnard v. Wharton. 912 P.2d 446 (Utah App. 1996). 
However, both cases are clearly distinguishable from this case and entirely consistent 
with the holdings in Espinoza and Kelsey. In fact, Stubbs actually supports Defendants' 
claim that the attorney's fee provision is abrogated. In Stubbs, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that the doctrine of merger did not extinguish the right of a buyer to claim damages 
14
 The holding in Espinoza with respect to the effect of an abrogation clause on 
attorney's fees has been followed in Barnhardt v. Gold Run, Inc., 843 P.2d 545 (Wash 
App. 1993). The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized the same principle in similar 
circumstances. See Petty Motor Lease, Inc. v. Jolley, 385 P.2d 782, 783 (Utah 1978) 
(where a contract of sale replaced a lease agreement, the lease agreement and an 
attorney's fee provision therein had no more force or effect). 
15
 Plaintiffs allege no other basis for the recovery of attorney's fees and admit that 
only the fees attributable to breach of the REPC are recoverable. (See Plaintiffs' 
Affidavit for Attorney's Fees and Costs). 
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for a seller's wrongful removal of certain fixtures from the property. Id. at 169-70. The 
Court found that the parties' agreement prohibiting the seller from removing certain 
fixtures survived the delivery of the deed to the buyer because it was clear from the 
agreement that the parties intended the prohibition against removal of fixtures to survive 
after delivery of the deed. Id. 
However, the Court, citing to Kelsey v. Hansen, stated that if there was "manifest 
intent to the contrary," that the manifest contrary intent would control. The manifest 
contrary intent in Kelsey was the abrogation provision similar to the one in this case. The 
Stubbs Court noted that the existence of an abrogation provision will extinguish a 
collateral act that may otherwise survive under the doctrine of merger. Id at 170, n. 4. 
In its holding in Maynard, this Court did not address the issue of awarding 
attorney's fees where there is an abrogation provision in a real estate contract because it 
determined that there was no breach of contract and, therefore, no attorney's fees could 
be awarded. Id. at 452. In dicta, however, this Court stated that attorney fees may be 
awarded for breach of an "explicit covenant or agreement contained in the earnest money 
agreement." Id. The Maynard dicta is not applicable in the present case for two reasons: 
First, it is dicta, and second, Maynard does not apply abrogation clauses, or the merger 
doctrine, or its exceptions, to attorney's fees provisions. 
Maynard does state (twice) that the merger doctrine "is a contractual statement of 
the common law doctrine of merger." Id. at 450 and 451. However, Maynard does not 
say that an abrogation clause is a contractual statement of the exceptions to the doctrine 
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of merger. And wisely so, because such a claim would fly in the face of Utah law as set 
forth in Espinoza. Kelsey, and this Court's own holding in Schafir v. Harrigan. 879 P.2d 
1384 (Utah App. 1994). 
In Schafir, this Court held that an abrogation clause (which did not exclude any 
express warranties) served to extinguish the liability of the seller for breach of a warranty 
regarding building code violations. Obviously, such a warranty is a collateral matter to 
the vesting of title and, therefore, would not be extinguished by the merger doctrine or the 
abrogation clause in that case (if, in fact, the abrogation clause is a contractual statement 
of the exceptions to the merger doctrine). However, in Schafir, this Court found that such 
a collateral matter did not survive—and could not be the basis for a breach of warranty 
claim-because of the abrogation clause in the parties' earnest money agreement. Id. at 
1392. 
Furthermore, to claim that an abrogation clause is a contractual statement of the 
exceptions to the merger doctrine would violate the most basic principle of contract 
interpretation; that a contract must be interpreted to reflect the intentions of the parties as 
set forth in the plain language of the contract. Hall v. Process Instruments and Control 
Inc., 866 P.2d 604, 605 (Utah App. 1993). "If the contract is in writing and the language 
is not ambiguous, the intention of the parties must be determined from the words of the 
agreement." Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). The abrogation 
clause in the REPC (and in most other contracts) says nothing about exceptions to 
abrogation based on the merger doctrine. It is clear the parties never contemplated or 
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intended that such exceptions should be applied to the abrogation clause in the REPC. 
The abrogation clause means exactly what it says: "Except for express warranties made in 
this Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing." 
Therefore, although Plaintiffs' claim for breach of warranty may survive, their 
right to attorney's fees does not. For these reasons, this Court should reverse the trial 
court's ruling that Plaintiffs are entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees under the 
REPC. 
B. Under the Express Terms of the Attorney's Fees Provision, Plaintiffs 
Are Not Entitled to Attorney's Fees Where There Are No Attorney's 
Fees. 
Under the facts of this case, Plaintiffs' claim for attorney's fees is barred by the 
terms of the attorney's fees provision itself. In this case-as Plaintiffs admit-they are 
paying no attorney's fees. (Affidavit of Mark Morris, pp. 2-3.) Plaintiffs' attorney has 
agreed to represent them for free and will only claim attorney's fees if they are recovered 
pursuant to the REPC. Plaintiffs have claimed that the Court should not consider this 
fact in connection with an award of attorney's fees and cite Barker v. Utah Public Serv. 
ComrrL, 970 P.2d 702 (Utah 1998) as support for that claim. 
Plaintiffs' use of Barker is terribly misplaced. Actually, the rationale given in 
Barker for awarding attorney's fees in pro bono cases strongly suggests that Plaintiffs' 
attorney's fees should be completely disallowed in this case. The rationale for awarding 
fees in Barker was based on federal civil rights statutes which encourage meritorious 
claims against civil rights violators that otherwise might not be brought. In Barker, 
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although civil rights were not involved, an award of fees for the pro bono work was 
allowed in order to "encourage the kind of public service performed" by the attorneys in 
that type of case (which involved overcharging by U.S. West to its ratepayers). Id. at 8. 
It is improper to equate the public policy considerations that exist in civil rights 
cases, and in Barker, with the facts of this case. In this case, defendants (who were 
apparently able to afford a $410,000 house), undoubtedly could have paid for an attorney. 
However, as the results of this case indicate, Plaintiffs' claims were so weak that they 
only recovered $42,000 of approximately $200,000 claimed. The amount awarded 
Plaintiffs is only $12,000 more than the offer of judgment given to Defendants more than 
three and a half months before trial (Affidavit of Stephen Quesenberry p.2). The only 
reason Plaintiffs were willing to expend over $50,000 in attorney hours billed in order to 
recover the extra $12,000 was because they knew they did not have to pay for it. It is 
highly unlikely that Defendants would have expended this amount if they had been 
obligated to actually pay $50,000 in attorney's fees. In other words, Defendants' fee 
agreement in this case fostered inefficient litigation of a weak case. If the fee agreement 
in this case is to be considered at all, it should be considered as a factor warranting 
elimination of attorney's fees. 
Apart from policy considerations, Barker is completely irrelevant to this case. In 
this case, the REPC, is the controlling basis for attorney's fees, not the civil rights statutes 
or common fund theories at issue in Barker. As set forth above, there can be no recovery 
under the REPC because it is expressly abrogated. However, even if it were not 
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abrogated, the REPC clearly states that a prevailing party is entitled to "reasonable 
attorney fees." Bv Plaintiffs' own admission, they have no attorney's fees at all (much 
less any reasonable fees)., and, therefore, they are entitled to nothing under the REPC. 
The REPC entitles only Plaintiffs to attorney fees, not Plaintiffs' attorney to attorney 
fees. 
Issue No. 5: Did the trial court err in the amount of attorneys fees and costs that it 
awarded to Plaintiffs? 
Plaintiffs claim attorneys fees and costs of over $60,000 for this case. On their 
claims for which attorneys fees (under their theory) are recoverable, they only obtained a 
verdict for $42,200.00. Furthermore, the work was not even done on a billable basis, but 
was donated by a brother to his brother. 
Plaintiffs' claimed costs and attorney's fees are not reasonable under the factors 
identified by Utah courts, as set forth in cases such as Govert Copier Painting v. Van 
Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 173 (Utah App. 1990). Instead, and in light of the relevant 
factors, Plaintiffs' claimed attorneys fees should be significantly reduced. 
The amount of work necessary to adequately prosecute this matter is shown by 
comparing the amount of attorneys fee billed by Defendants' attorney ($27,806.00 to 
defend all claims including fraud, etc.), to the $55,000 awarded to Plaintiff for 
prosecuting just one claim (breach of warranty). This disparity alone shows that the fees 
awarded were unreasonable. Richard Barton Enter., Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P. 2d 368, 381 
(Utah 1996). The issues in this case were not difficult or novel. The matter was 
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performed for a family member and for which counsel was willing, if necessary, to 
perform without compensation. This case thus did not preclude employment by other 
clients. Defendants' attorney charged more than is reasonable and normal in Utah 
County. In the end, Defendants obtained just $12,000 more in this case than the $30,000 
offer of judgment that Defendants offered before trial, and in total only recovered one 
quarter of what their claimed damages were. This Court must decide if spending $55,000 
in fees to obtain an additional $12,000 is reasonable. For these reasons, as well as the 
other Brown factors, the fee award must be reduced to an appropriate amount. 
Issue No. 6: Is the jury verdict awarding damages of $5000 to John Covey against 
Linda Hatch supported by the evidence? 
At trial, the jury awarded Plaintiff, John Covey, $5,000.00 in damages despite the 
complete lack of any evidence suggesting that Mr. Covey had suffered any damages. In 
fact, John Covey testified that he had no idea if any of the items in his contract had or had 
not been completed by Linda Hatch. Transcript, Vol. I, p. 56-57. He testified that he did 
not know if he had been damaged by the Defendants. Id. 
In order to warrant an award of damages, a plaintiff must prove: 
"First, [the plaintiff] must prove the fact of damages. The evidence must do more 
than merely give rise to speculation that damages in fact occurred; it must give rise to a 
reasonable probability that the plaintiff suffered damage as result of a breach. Second, 
the plaintiff must prove the amount of damages. The level of persuasiveness required to 
establish the fact of loss is generally higher than that required to establish the amount of a 
loss." 
Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 709 P.2d 330, 
36 
336 (Utah 1985). In Atkin Wright the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's 
award of lost income to the plaintiff because the proof offered by the plaintiff of lost 
gross income was an insufficient foundation to support an award of lost net income. Id. 
Here, there was not even an attempt made by Mr. Covey to present evidence which 
might prove the fact that he had damaged as a result of the Defendant's actions. 
Obviously, if there is no evidence to show that Mr. Covey did, in fact, suffer damages 
there was no basis for determining the amount of damages suffered by Mr. Covey. 
The jury clearly erred in awarding damages to Mr. Covey and accordingly the 
award should be reversed on appeal. 
Issue No. 7: Is the jury verdict awarding damages of $9,792.00 against Guy Hatch 
for real estate agency violations supported by the evidence? 
At trial, the jury awarded Plaintiffs damages in the amount of $9,792.00 against 
Guy Hatch for real estate agency violations. Defendants request that this award be 
reversed as Plaintiffs presented absolutely no evidence upon which the amount of these 
damages could be calculated. At best, the only witness questioned about this issue (Guy 
Hatch) stated that he could not recall what he had been paid for his commission. 
Although some degree of uncertainty in the amount of damages is acceptable once 
the fact of damages has been established, an award of damages based only on speculation 
cannot be upheld. Sampson v. Richins. 770P.2d998, 1007 (Utah App. 1989). "The 
amount of damages may be based on approximations if, the fact of damages is 
established, and the approximations are based upon reasonable assumptions or 
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projections." Atkin Wright, supra, at 336. 
At trial, Plaintiffs failed to proffer any reasonable assumptions or projections as to 
the amount of damages resulting from Guy Hatch's alleged real estate agency violations. 
Accordingly, the amount of these damages are necessarily speculative and cannot be 
upheld on appeal. 
Issue No. 8: Did the trial err in denying Defendants' Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict, or, in the Alternative, For a New Trial? 
Defendants are entitled to judgment as matter of law as to all damages awarded for 
alleged defects in the house which Plaintiffs knew about before purchasing the house. As 
set forth in the Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment previously submitted to the Court (discussed above): 
"Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract necessarily rely on the Agreement 
between the parties and the Warranties contained therein. Claims relating to 
conditions of the Property that do not relate to habitability or workmanship of the 
Property or any other item expressly covered by the Warranties are abrogated and 
merged into the deed The abrogation clause of the Agreement itself and Utah case 
law firmly establish this point. Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1392 (Utah 
App. 1994). This includes any alleged building code violations. Id. 
Because the warranty terms of the Agreement in the present case are 
clearly stated and unambiguous, the warranties are to be interpreted by the 
Court as a matter of law. Furthermore, inasmuch as the Addendum 
warranty provision was drafted by Plaintiffs, it will be construed against 
them. 
[The evidence showed that] certain alleged defects claimed by 
Plaintiffs were indisputably known prior to the closing. The Buyers both 
admit that they viewed and inspected the Property on several occasions and 
hired an inspector to thoroughly inspect the Property. They noted the 
alleged defects set forth above and did not include such items in the 
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Warranties. They cannot rely on any other alleged warranty or 
representation inasmuch as the Agreement constitutes the entire agreement 
between the parties. (Agreement, 1[ 14.) Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot 
recover under breach of contract for [items which they knew about prior to 
purchasing the house]/' 
(Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 6-7.) 
Issue No. 9: Did the trial court err in not allowing Defendant Guy Hatch to testify 
about whether the winter when they had resided in the house was cold or whether there 
was snow on the ground? 
Fundamental fairness requires that a party be permitted to introduce evidence to 
rebut inferences the jury can draw from the opposing party's evidence. Astill v. Clark, 
956 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Utah App. 1998). One of the main issues in this case was the 
condition and adequacy of the heating system in the house. During Plaintiffs' case in 
chief, they testified that the house was freezing in the winter; this was one of their largest 
complaints. 
Defendants lived in the house in question during the winter of 1994. In order to 
refute Plaintiffs' testimony about the adequacy of the heating system in the house and the 
temperature inside, Defendants sought to testify that the winter they spent in the house 
was cold and snowy, yet they had been very comfortable walking around in T-Shirts and 
shorts. The trial court denied Defendant's this opportunity (Trial Transcript, Vol. IV, 
pp. 933 (line 25) to 934 (lines 1-4). The trial court's decision to exclude this testimony 
was an abuse of discretion which should be reversed on appeal. 
Issue No. 10: Did the trial court err in not allowing Exhibit 56 E, an enlargement 
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of a picture offered and entered by Plaintiffs, to be admitted into evidence by 
Defendants? 
At trial dozens of photographs depicting the home in question were entered into 
evidence. One of these photographs was offered to show a "negative slope" on the 
property. During their case in chief, Defendants attempted to offer into evidence an 
enlargement of Plaintiffs' photograph (Exhibit 56 E) which provides greater detail and 
rebuts Plaintiffs' claim of the negative slope. Plaintiffs' counsel stated "It is duplicative, 
your Honor; but I don't have any objection." To which the trial court responded, "I 
sustain the duplicative objection." (Trial Transcript, Vol. IV, p. 944, lines 7-14). The 
trial court refused to enter admit the enlargement into evidence. 
Utah courts have held that photographs cannot be excluded as being duplicative if 
the photographs in question clarify, rebut or depict more clearly issues placed before the 
fact finder. In State v. Betha. 957 P.2d 611 (Utah App. 1998), the trial court's decision to 
admit various photographs depicting the victims wound's caused by the defendant's 
assault was affirmed over the defendant's cumulative evidence objection. The Betha 
Court stated "...the photos are not duplicative of one another...the challenged photos more 
clearly show the extent of [the victim's] injuries than [other admitted photos]." See also 
Van Dvke v. Ogden Savines Bank, 161 P. 50, 53 (Utah 1919) ( "[T]he enlarged 
signatures make much clearer the characteristics and peculiarities of the signatures that 
are in dispute, and therefore make clear that which, without them, was obscure and 
extremely doubtful.") 
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Similarly, in the instant case, the enlarged photograph which Defendants sought to 
admit into evidence, made much clearer the characteristics and details of the alleged 
defect. Accordingly, the enlargement of the photo was not cumulative and the court 
abused its discretion in not admitting the enlarged photograph. 
Issue No. 11: Did the trial court err in not allowing Defendants re-direct 
examination of Guy Hatch? 
At Vol. IV, p. 999, line 21 of the Trial Transcript, Plaintiffs' counsel completed an 
approximately 20 question re-cross examination of Defendant, Guy Hatch. This cross-
examination concerned the compensation received by Defendants for their efforts in 
constructing the house. This was a key issue of Plaintiffs' case. At the completion of the 
re-cross examination, Defense counsel requested to ask one last question of Mr. Hatch 
but was denied by the Trial Court. 
A party on redirect examination should be able to explain answers to questions 
asked on cross-examination. King v. Barron, 770 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah 1988). Here, after 
the re-cross examination of Mr. Hatch, the jury was left with the impression that 
Defendants had taken excess compensation for the construction of the house bolstering 
Plaintiffs' theory that not enough money had been spent on the materials and 
craftsmanship in building the house resulting in defects. It is clear from the exchange 
between Mr. Hatch and Plaintiffs' counsel that Mr. Hatch was confused by the questions 
presented him. Defense counsel wanted to clarify any confusion and correct any 
misleading inferences. It was an abuse of discretion and harmful the Defendants' case to 
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not allow one question on redirect examination after a lengthy cross-examination. 
Issue No. 12: Did the trial court err in not allowing Mr. Hatch to testify as to his 
personal observations of the clothing his children wore in the allegedly cold basement? 
Defendants attempted to introduce testimony from Linda Hatch, confirming her 
husband's testimony that their children were comfortable sleeping in T-Shirts and shorts 
in the basement of the house during the winter. The trial court sustained Plaintiffs' 
duplicative objection, denying Mrs. Hatch the opportunity to testify on this issue. (Trial 
Transcript, Vol. IV, pp. 1016 (lines 20-25) and 1017 (line 1). 
Mrs. Hatch had not previously testified regarding her children's sleeping attire in 
the basement and accordingly, the Trial Court abused its discretion in sustaining 
Plaintiffs' duplicative objection. Mr. Hatch had testified regarding the children's clothing 
in the basement of the house, however, since the adequacy of the heating system in the 
house was a major issue of Plaintiffs' case, Defendants should have been allowed to have 
more than one person testify as to the temperature and conditions in the basement during 
the winter. 
Issue No. 13: Did the trial court err in excluding Exhibit 66, a video demonstrating 
that the house was not cold? 
The trial court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239 (Utah 1992). However, the trial court's 
conclusions of law should be reviewed for correctness. The trial court's ruling under 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 that proffered evidence's prejudicial effect outweighed its 
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probative value is a conclusion of law. State v. Betha, 957 P.2d 611,614 (Utah App. 
1998). 
For the first time at trial, Plaintiffs testified of a "cold wind" blowing through 
alleged cracks in the house. Plaintiff, Liz Morris testified that she could "feel the wind 
blowing" inside the house and that the "basement was freezing cold." (Transcript, Vol. I 
p. 80, lines 13-20). She later testified that "I like to live in a home where the wind 
doesn't blow through the walls." (Transcript, Vol I, p. 140, lines 12-13). 
Plaintiffs' claims in this regard were not reasonably anticipated as it was brought 
up for the first time at trial. Defendants argued that Plaintiffs' claims regarding wind 
blowing through the house and freezing temperature inside during the winter was grossly 
exaggerated. In support of their argument, Defendants located a video tape depicting the 
Defendants and their family in the very room in question on a cold, snowy Christmas 
morning. In the video, Defendants and their children can be seen walking around with 
bare feet, in thin pajamas and wearing shorts. This clearly refutes and impeaches 
Plaintiffs' testimony that during the winter, cold wind blew through alleged cracks in the 
walls making the basement freezing. 
Plaintiffs objected to the video because it was not disclosed by Defendants prior to 
trial and that its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. (Transcript, Vol. 
Ill, p. 626.) The trial court sustained Plaintiffs' objections after hearing argument from 
both sides and viewing the video tape. (Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill, pp. 629-630). 
If the party seeking to admit the undisclosed evidence could not have reasonably 
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anticipated, before trial, that the evidence would be necessary to rebut a claim of the 
opposing party, the evidence should be admitted. Turner v. Nelson. 872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 
1994). Here, at no time prior to trial during discovery, did Plaintiffs make the claim that 
there was wind blowing through the house. The first time Defendants were aware of this 
claim was during Liz Morris' testimony on the first day of trial. Therefore, there was no 
way Defendants could have reasonably anticipated this claim from Plaintiffs and the trial 
court abused its discretion in excluding the video tape on this ground. 
Fundamental fairness requires that a party be permitted to introduce evidence to 
rebut inferences the jury can draw from the opposing party's evidence. Astill v. Clark, 
956 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Utah App. 1998). Here, the video tape was highly probative as it 
depicted the exact room in question, during the winter time with Defendants and their 
children walking around very comfortable in thin pajamas and shorts. This directly 
rebuts Liz Morris' testimony that the room was "freezing" and had a "cold wind blowing 
through it." Whatever slight prejudicial effect the video might have because the jury 
would see Defendant's children is clearly outweighed by the high probative value of the 
tape. The trial court erred in excluding this video tape and accordingly should be 
reversed. 
Issue No. 14: Did the trial court err in allowing Plaintiff to ask questions on 
redirect outside the scope of cross examination? 
In Vol. Ill, p. 712, lines 12-18 of the trial transcript, Plaintiff, Michael Morris is 
being examined on re-direct. He is asked whether Defendants ever told him there was no 
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certificate of occupancy issued on the house. The issuance of a certificate of occupancy 
on the house was never brought up on direct examination of Mr. Morris nor during his 
cross-examination. 
The scope of re-direct examination is limited to the field covered during cross-
examination. State v. Cooper, 201 P.2d 764, 768 (Utah 1949). "Even testimony which 
may have some slight weight or tendency to rebut the inferences raised on 
cross-examination may not be admitted if it is too remote, or collateral to the principal 
inquiry." Id. 
Here, Mr. Morris' testimony regarding the certificate of occupancy on the house 
didn't even have "slight weight or tendency to rebut the inferences raised on cross-
examination" because the issue was never raised before. Yet the court erroneously 
overruled Defendants' objection. The court's error was an abuse of discretion which 
should be reversed on appeal. 
Issue No. 15: Did the trial court err in allowing the complete bank records 
relating to the draws on the construction account to be entered in evidence? 
This is a construction defect case. The issues to be determined were (1) whether 
there were defects in the house at issue, and (2) if there were defects, what would cost 
take to repair them? The court, over objection of Defendants' attorney, allowed 
voluminous bank records to come into evidence, mostly consisting of the "Draw" 
information: showing what was paid as the house in issue was constructed. How much 
something cost was not relevant in determining if something was defective. A part of the 
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house either is defective or it is not, irregardless of what the part may have cost to create. 
Introduction of the bank records was solely intended to show the profit that Mr. Hatch 
made on the house, and to thereby somehow make him look bad. The bank records were 
irrelevant, and introducing them was highly prejudicial to the Defendants because it 
focused the jury on the overall profits made on the house, and away from whether an 
particular aspect of the house was defective. URE 410, 403. 
In the alternative, the Court could have allowed the Plaintiff to ask about the cost 
of any particular items at issue, and then to impeach the Defendants or refresh their 
memory if needed. Putting in all the records was unnecessary and highly prejudicial. 
Issue No. 16: Did the trial court err in allowing the heating contractor who 
installed the HVAC system in the house at issue in the lawsuit testify about his "feelings 
about the occupant of the home as [he] drove by"? 
As set forth in the Statement of Facts, the trial court allowed a HVAC 
contractor-the very contractor who has installed the heating system in the original house 
for Defendant Hatch- to testify about the "feelings" he had for the Morris family as he 
drove by the house. He testified that he felt horrible for the Morris family, and that he 
felt sorry for them. These statements were not statements of fact, but rather statements of 
a person-not a party-regarding feelings he had as he drove by a house. Such "feelings" 
in this context are not evidence and are not relevant to determining if defects exist in a 
house. They are not facts admissible to prove a case. Furthermore, even if they were 
relevant, their prejudicial effect would far outweigh whatever minimal evidentiary value 
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they might have. Utah Rules of Evidence 410, 403. This testimony was emotionally-
charged, and could not help but inflame the jury and operate solely on the juries 
sympathies and emotions. This testimony was devastating to the Defendants as well. 
Issue No. 17: Did the trial court err in allowing Plaintiffs architectural expert to 
testify about the nature of the crack in the turret? 
Plaintiffs called Arthur Pasker, an architect, as an expert witness at trial. Mr. 
Pasker is not an engineer. During cross-examination or Mr. Pasker he testified that he did 
not know whether a particular crack in around the perimeters of a turret was structural 
(rather than cosmetic). (Trial Transcript, Vol. II, p. 436, lines 2-5). 
Later on re-direct, Plaintiffs' attorney asked Mr. Pasker his opinion on why the 
crack had formed around the turret. Mr. Pasker again stated that he did not know, but 
then went on to speculate that because it was a horizontal crack, he was worried that it 
might be structural. Defense counsel objected to this line of questioning and moved the 
court to strike Mr. Pasker's answer because he was speculating. The Trial Court 
overruled the objection and allowed the testimony to stand. (Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 438 
(lines 7-25) and 439 (lines 1-3)). 
"The rule of evidence relative to the reliable testimony of an expert does not allow 
speculation." State v. Pendergrass, 803 P.2d 1261, 1265 (Utah App. 1990). In Stevensen 
v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339 (Utah 1996), the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's 
decision to strike the testimony of a structural engineer concerning damage to the 
building in question resulting from tie-backs when, on cross-examination, the expert 
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admitted that he was speculating. Id. at 346-347. 
Likewise in this case, Mr. Pasker admitted that he would be speculating as to the 
nature of the crack around the turret. Yet later, the trial court allowed him to testify that 
he was concerned that the crack was, in fact, structural. This testimony was improper 
speculation and harmful to the Defendants' case on a key issue at trial. This abuse of 
discretion by the Trial Court must be reversed on appeal. 
Issue No. 18: Did the trial court err in allowing Christopher Miller to render expert 
plumbing testimony? 
As set forth above, Christopher Miller was allowed by the Court to offer expert 
testimony in the plumbing area. He was never qualified as an expert. When defendants' 
attorney objected to his qualifications, the trial court acknowledged that no expert 
foundation had been established, and told Plaintiffs' attorney to qualify Mr. Miller as an 
expert. Instead of doing that, Plaintiffs' attorney kept on questioning him. When 
Defendants' attorney renewed his objection, he was overruled. 
Mr. Miller rendered significant testimony about plumbing shortcomings in the 
house, even though there was no basis for him to do so. There are no facts in the record 
to support Mr. Miller's ability to testify as an expert in plumbing. He is not licensed, and 
he established none of the criteria required by Utah Rule of Evidence 702. He should 
never have been allowed to testify, and allowing him to testify was extremely damaging 
to the Defendants. 
Issue No. 19: Did the court err in prohibiting the introduction of the Hatch offer to 
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purchase the house before trial for $463,000.00? 
Defendant Guy Hatch made an offer to purchase the house at issue, an offer 
unrelated to the litigation (not conditioned in any way on a release of claims, etc.). His 
cash offer was not accepted by Plaintiffs Morris. The Plaintiffs claimed that it would 
cost over $200,000 to repair their house (and even then leave it with a stigma). Mr. 
Hatch's offer was to buy the house back, for $30,000 more than the Morrises had 
purchased the house for. This was highly relevant to Defendants' argument that the 
Morrises were not as damaged as they claimed, and was in no way a settlement offer (it 
was not an offer to compromise the claim in any way- the lawsuit could have gone on). 
The evidence should have been received. 
Issue No. 20: Did the cumulative effect of all the above-cited errors create a 
situation where a fair trial could not and did not take place before the trial court? 
Defendants believe that all of the above-referenced errors were harmful (and not 
harmless) to their case. The cumulative effect, however, is devastating. In the trial at 
issue, there was a pattern of continual denial of proper objections, the sustaining of 
objections that are not even made, and improper rulings on key issues. These errors 
compounded on one another, were all made in the presence of a jury. Perhaps this Court 
will find, as did the Utah Supreme Court in Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 
801 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990): "While no one error by itself perhaps mandates reversal, 
the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence that defendants 
were able to present to the jury their theory of the case and that a fair trial was had." 
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Cumulative error is about essential fairness. The pattern of rulings in this trial seem to 
indicate that the Defendants were simply not given a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above-reasoning and argument, Defendants respectfully request that 
the award of attorneys fees be reversed, and that no attorneys fees be awarded to 
Plaintiffs. In the alternative, Defendants request that the award of attorneys fees be 
reduced, or the this Court remand the attorneys fees matter back to the trial judge for a 
reduction. Defendants further request that the judgments against Defendant Linda Hatch 
and Defendant Guy Hatch be reversed for insufficiency of the evidence. Defendants 
further request that the judgments against Defendants Parkinson be reversed, based on the 
arguments about caveat emptor and warranty. In the alternative, Defendants ask that a 
new trial be granted, based on the numerous evidentiary errors and the cumulative effect 
of the errors, as well as on the other grounds that have been addressed in this brief. 
Dated this 8th day of May, 2000. 
Hill, Johnson & Schmutz 
S,t6pnen Quesbfltrerry, A 
Appellants 
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Summary Judgment. Mr Long addresses the court as to the Motion In 
Limine^—Mr—Morris responds.- Mr Long responds. The court 
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matter may be raised again during the trial. 
Mr Long addresses the court as to the remaining evidence. Mr 
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As to the remaining issues, the court denies the Motion In Limine 
as premature. 
Counsel review disputes over proposed jury instructions and voir 
dire. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL MORRIS; ELIZABETH ] 
MORRIS; and JOHN COVEY, ; 
Plaintiffs, ] 
V S . j 
DAN PARKINSON; CYNTHIA ] 
PARKINSON; LINDA HATCH; and ] 
GUY HATCH, ] 
Defendants. ) 
I DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE 
i Civil No. 970400584 
i Judge Ray Harding Jr. 
Defendants file this Motion in Limine to exclude certain witness from testifying, and to 
exclude testimony from any person on certain issues as set forth below. This Motion is 
supported by the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted herewith. 
I. Defendants should not be allowed to call the following witnesses. 
A. "Fact and Possibly Expert Witnesses" 
The only issues before the Court, and the only issues which should be presented to the 
jury, deal with the construction of the subject home located at 9 Meadowbrook Drive in Alpine, 
Utah, and specifically whether there was a warranty issued by Hatch to Plaintiffs, the extent 
thereof, and whether it was honored. Examples of matters not at issue, but which Plaintiffs are 
apparently attempting to interject, are such matters as Hatch's credit record, Hatch's former 
dealings in the construction industry and, incredibly, Hatch's former dealings in the restaurant 
business. 
The numerous potential witnesses identified by Plaintiffs have no personal knowledge of 
the issues before the Court, and therefore should not be allowed to testify on grounds of 
competence, URE 602; relevance, URE 402; hearsay, URE 801 and 802; and unfair prejudice, 
URE 403. These witnesses are: Roger Zundel (No. 14); Howard Sigel (No. 15); Charmayne 
Allsop (No. 16); Allen Van Orman1 (No. 17); Kirk and Maiy Hoeffling (No. 20); Craig Nielson 
(No. 22); Robert Harris (No. 29); Rodger Smith (No. 30); and individuals with relevant 
knowledge at Carson Excavating, Nicholas & Company, CMA, All Seasons Insulation, Inc.; 
Standard Restaurant Equipment; and Credit Bureau of Ogden (Nos. 31-36). 
The witnesses are persons with whom Defendants, particularly defendant Hatch, has had 
dealings in the past, none of which relate to the house at issue, and some of which do not even 
pertain to the construction business. Testimony from these witnesses could only be presented for 
*Mr. Van Orman's testimony should further be excluded because he has been dead for 
several years. Defendants respectfully submit that, since Mr. Van Orman is beyond the subpoena 
power of the Court, Defendants will be deprived of their right to conduct meaningful cross 
examination. 
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the purpose of showing "prior bad acts'9 or possible dishonesty of Defendants, and should 
therefore not be allowed under URE 404(b), 608, and 403. 
Plaintiff therefore move that this Court enter its order excluding any of these witnesses 
from testifying. 
B. Defendants' Expert Witnesses 
Defendants retained two expert witnesses, Peter Williams and Ray Noble, to assist with 
trial preparation. These experts also prepared a report titled "Inspect-A-Home USA". These 
witnesses will not be called at trial. 
Defendants move for the Court's order that Plaintiffs should not be allowed to call these 
witnesses or to utilize the witnesses' report at trial, or in any way refer or allude to the fact that 
these witnesses were retained by Defendants. Their testimony is not discoverable under URE 
26(b)(4)(B) and the work product doctrines, and the fact that they were ever retained by 
Defendants should not be presented to the jury under URE 402 and 403. 
II. Evidence or testimony of certain issues should not be admitted. 
Defendants submit that numerous issues which have arisen during the course of discovery 
should not be introduced as evidence at trial, and therefore move that this Court enter its order 
that Plaintiffs not introduce any evidence, or make any reference, allusion, or implication to the 
jury regarding the following issues, for the reasons noted and discussed further in the 
accompanying memorandum: 
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A. A fire at the subject house. URE 402, 403. 
B. The family relationship or employment of Plaintiff, John Covey. URE 402, 403. 
C. The religious affiliation of any party to or witness in this action. URE 402, 403. 
D. The character of Defendants. URE 608, 404, 402 and 403. 
E. Settlement offers or settlement discussions. URE 408, 402 and 403. 
F. The timing of payments by Defendant Hatch to any subcontractors or suppliers, or 
any alleged improprieties regarding the construction financing on the subject 
house. URE 402, 403. 
G. The total cost of the home, or Defendants' profit or loss on the sale of the home. 
URE 402,403. 
H. A "punch list." URE 1002. 
I. Defects first "noticed" after the two year warranty period had expired. URE 402, 
403. 
J. Defects of which the Plaintiffs had actual or constructive knowledge at the time 
they bought the home. URE 402, 403. 
CONCLUSION 
This case is based on, and should be decided on, a very narrow issue-whether there was a 
warranty from Hatch to Plaintiffs, the extent of that warranty, and whether it was honored. Any 
other matters regarding the history of Defendants and particularly Defendant Hatch as set forth 
4 
above are extraneous, irrelevant, and prejudicial, and should be excluded. Defendants therefore 
move this court to enter its order excluding the witnesses named in Section I above, and ordering 
that no party or witness provide any testimony which refers, relates, or alludes to, or in any way 
insinuates any of the issues listed in Section II above. 
DATED this^T^-day of January, 1999. 
Hill, Johnson & Schmutz P.C. 
StenfcteikE. Qui 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the / day of January, 1999, they caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the following: 
Mark O. Morris 
Snell & Wilmer 
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900 
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Case No: 970400584 CV 
Judge: RAY HARDING, JR. 
Date: January 19, 1999 
Clerk: miket 
PRESENT 
Plaintiffs Attorney(s) : MARK O MORRIS 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LANCE N LONG 
STEPHEN QUESENBERRY 
Video 
Tape Number: 4 Tape Count: 11:07 
HEARING 
Mr Morris addresses the court. The court denies the Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Mr Long addresses the court as to the Motion In 
Limine-.—Mr—Morris responds. Mr Long responds. The court 
questions counsel. Discussion ensues. 
The court denies the Motion In Limine as to witnesses, but the 
matter may be raised again during the trial. 
Mr Long addresses the court as to the remaining evidence. Mr 
Morris responds. Discussion ensues. Counsel reach a stipulation 
concerning certain evidence. The court approves the stipulation. 
As to the remaining issues, the court denies the Motion In Limine 
as premature. 
Counsel review disputes over proposed jury instructions and voir 
dire. 
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) Defendants' Proposed Disputed Jury 
Instructions 
l Civil No. 970400584 
) Judge Ray Harding Jr. 
Defendants, through counsel, submit the following disputed jury instructions numbered 
D-1 and D-2. For the reasons set forth in Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
Defendants submit that these instructions should be presented to the jury. 
DATED this day of January, 1999. 
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. D-l 
You are instructed that the law of Utah recognizes the doctrine of caveat emptor in 
regard to the sale of a used building. Under the doctrine of caveat emptor, a buyer may not 
recover for any defects in a property of which he was aware, or reasonably should have been 
aware, at the time the plaintiff agreed to purchase the property. 
If you find that the plaintiffs Michael and Elizabeth Morris knew, or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have known, about the existence of all matters which they allege to 
be defective, then your verdict must be for Guy Hatch. 
Similarly, if you find that the plaintiffs Michael and Elizabeth Morris knew, or in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, about the existence of some, but not all, 
of the matters which they allege to be defective, then you may not award damages to the 
plaintiffs for those matters. 
Reference: Utah State Medical Assoc, v. Utah State Employees Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643, 
645 (Utah 1982) 
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. D-2,. 
The Court instructs you that a warranty, as it applies to a home, does not extend to 
provide coverage to matters which were known to the purchaser at the time of the purchase. 
If you find that the plaintiffs Michael and Elizabeth Morris knew at the time of the 
purchase about the existence of all matters which they allege to be defective, then your verdict 
must be for defendant Hatch. 
Similarly, if you find that the plaintiffs Michael and Elizabeth Morris knew at the time 
of the purchase about the existence of some, but not all, of the matters which they allege to be 
defective, then you may not award damages to the plaintiffs for those matters. 
Reference: Groen v. Tri-0 Inc., 667 P.2d 598 (Utah 1983); Maack v. Resource Design & 
Construction, 875 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1994), citing Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 
P.2d 733, 736 (Wyo. 1979). 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Stephen Quesenberry, hereby certify that I served a copy of the aboye and foregoing 
Defendants* Proposed Disputed Jury Instructions to Michael Morris by hand-delivery. 
DATED this " 2 ^ - ^ day of January, 1999. 
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Video 
TRIAL 
Jury trial is in it's 3rd day. David Layton resumes the stand and 
continues 4:o~testi~f-yas=Jca-tled: by-Mr Morris. Pltf's #46 off. & 
rec'd. Cross-exam by Mr Quesenberry. Def's #55 g off. & rec'd. 
Def's #64 A mk, id (photo), off. & rec'd. Photos are pub-
lished. Def's #64 f, & g id (photos), off. & rec'd. Photos are 
published. Def's 57A id (photo). Def's #57 B id (photo) Def's 57 C 
id (photo). Def's 57D id (photo). Def's #57E id (photo). Def's #57 
F,G,H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, Q, R, U off. all received 
except R & U. Re-direct by Mr Morris. Re-cross by Mr Quesenberry. 
Re-direct by Mr Morris. Jury is excued for lunch. Counsel and 
Court discuss the jury insturctions and the special verdict. Both 
counsel stipulate to instructions 1-36. Mr Quesenberry add-
resses instruction #37. Response by Mr Morris. Court concurs with 
t^ha^ltf «and denies instruction #37. Mr Quesenberry addresses 
instruction as to warranty.^Response by Mr Morris. Instruction as 
Case No: 970400584 
Date: Jan 22, 1999 
to warranty is denied. Court having viewed def s #66 (video) 
denies the exhibit. Michael P. Morris sworn and testifies as 
called by Mr Morris. Pltf's #41 A published to the jury. Pltf's #41 
BBB published to the jury. Pltf's #37 id (invoice), off. & rec'd. 
Cross-exam by Mr Quesenberry. Def's # 56 EE id (photo), off. 
Def's #53 id. Re-direct by Mr Morris. Re-cross by Mr Quesenberry. 
Jury is excused. Plaintiff rests. Mr Quesenberry makes a motion 
for direct verdict with argument to the court. Response by Mr 
Morris. Mr Quesenberry responds. Motion taken under advise-
ment. Darrin Smith sworn and testifies as called by Mr 
Quesenberry. Cross-exam by mr Morris. Theron Bunker sworn and 
testifies as called by Mr Quesenberry. Cross-exam by Mr Morris. 
Re-direct by Mr Quesenberry. Re-cross by Mr Morris. Scott Prestwich 
sworn 
testifies as called by Mr Quesenberry. Re-cross by Mr Morris. 
Deposition of Scott Prestwich published as requested by Mr Morris. 
Re-direct by Mr Quesenberry. Steven Robins sworn and testifies as 
called by Mr Quesenberry. Cross-exam by Mr Morris. Rick 
Roberts sworn and testifies as called by mr Quesenberry. 
Cross-exam by Mr Morris. Tracy Burnham sworn and testifies as 
called by Mr Quesenberry. Cross-exam by Mr Morris. Re-direct by Mr 
Quesenberry. Re-cross by Mr Morris. At 5:02 p.m. court recesses 
until 
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Case No. 970400584 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees 
and Costs, and on Defendants' Motion to Tax Costs. The Court has reviewed the file, the 
memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral arguments, and being fully advised in the premises, 
hereby issues the following: 
RULING 
On February 3, 1999, Plaintiffs filed with this Court Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of 
Attorney's Fees and Costs, with an accompanying memorandum. On February 16, 1999, 
Defendants filed with this Court Defendants' Motion to Tax Plaintiffs' Bill of Costs. Also on 
February 16, 1999, Defendants filed a Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Tax 
Costs and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs. On 
February 26, 1999, Plaintiffs' filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs. On April 6, 1999, the Court heard oral arguments on 
these matters. 
Plaintiffs seek an award of attorney's fees based on the jury verdict rendered on 
January 26, 1999. In that verdict, the jury found in favor of Plaintiff Michael Morris and 
Plaintiff Elizabeth Morris on the breach of contract claim in the amount of $42,220.00 to be 
paid by Defendant Dan Parkinson and Cynthia Parkinson. The jury found in favor of 
Defendant Guy Hatch on the intentional or negligent misrepresentation claim. The jury found 
in favor of Plaintiff John Covey on the breach of contract claim in the amount of $5,000.00 to 
be paid by Defendant Linda Hatch. Finally, the jury found in favor of Plaintiff Michael 
Morris and Plaintiff Elizabeth Morris on the violation of real estate agency statutes claim in 
the amount of $9,792.00 to be paid by Defendant Guy Hatch. The Court will address the 
attorney's fees issue and the costs issue in turn. 
Attorney's Fees 
"Attorney fees may only be awarded if authorized by statute or contract." Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracev. 781 P.2d 414, 419-20 (Utah 1989). "However, regardless of 
whether the basis for an award of fees is contractual or statutory, only a reasonable fee may be 
recovered." IcL at 420. 
Plaintiffs claim that they should recover their reasonable attorney's fees incurred in 
prosecuting their breach of contract claim. The Plaintiffs cite to paragraph 17 of the Real 
Estate Purchase Contract (hereinafter "REPC") which states that "[i]n any action arising out of 
this Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees." 
Second, Plaintiffs claim that the amount of their requested attorney's fees are reasonable under 
the circumstances. 
Ruling Page 2 
Defendants claim that the attorney's fees provision in the REPC was abrogated and so 
not applicable. The Defendants cite to paragraph 19 of the REPC which states that "[ejxcept 
for the express warranties made in this Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not apply 
after closing." Second, the Defendants claim that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney's 
fees because there were no attorney's fees expended. Specifically, that Plaintiffs' attorney 
agreed to perform legal services on behalf of the Plaintiffs without requiring that they should 
be personally obligated for the fees incurred. Finally, the Defendants claim that the Plaintiffs' 
attorney's fees are excessive and unreasonable. 
Generally, an abrogation provision in a real estate purchase contract has the effect of 
making the deed the final agreement and all prior terms, whether written or verbal, are 
extinguished and unenforceable. See Stubbs v. Hemmert. 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977); 
Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co.. 598 P.2d 346 (Utah 1979). "However, if the original 
contract calls for performance by the seller of some act collateral to conveyance of title, his 
obligation with respect thereto survive the deed and are not extinguished by it." Stubbs v. 
Hemmert 567 P.2d at 169. 
In this case, both the attorney's fees provision and the abrogation provision are 
standard contract provisions found in real estate purchase contracts. The jury found that 
Defendant Dan Parkinson and Defendant Cynthia Parkinson had breached the REPC. 
Although not stated in the Jury Verdict, it is clear that the jury found from the evidence 
presented at trial that Defendant Dan Parkinson and Defendant Cynthia Parkinson violated 
paragraph 9 of the Addendum to the REPC which states that "Seller warrants all workmanship, 
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habitability, systems of all kinds, and roof for period of two years." This express warranty 
clearly was meant by the parties to be collateral to the conveyance of title and so survives the 
abrogation provision. 
The Defendants cite to Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. as controlling in this case. 
However, "[i]ssues relating to title and encumbrances are central rather than collateral to 
agreements for the sale of real property." Maynard v. Wharton. 912 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996). Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. involved an encumbrance which was central 
rather than collateral to the agreement for the sale of real estate, so the Court finds Espinoza v. 
Safeco Title Ins. Co. inapplicable. 
Rather, the Court finds Maynard v. Wharton to be controlling in this case. Specifically 
that "attorneys fees may be awarded . . . only when one party can show that the other party 
has defaulted on an explicit covenant or agreement contained in the earnest money agreement." 
Id at 452. In Maynard v. Wharton, the sellers could not point to an express agreement to 
which the buyers defaulted, so the Court could not award of attorney's fees, but the Court 
went on to suggest that an award of attorney's fees may have been proper had the sellers 
pointed to a violation of an express agreement in the contract. See id. In this case, the jury 
clearly found that Defendant Dan Parkinson and Defendant Cynthia Parkinson had violated an 
express agreement between the parties, so attorney's fees are proper. As a result, the 
Plaintiffs' are entitled to reasonable attorney's fees. 
The Defendants second objection to an award of attorney's fees is based on an 
agreement between Plaintiffs' attorney and the Plaintiffs whereby the Plaintiffs' attorney 
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agreed to perform legal services on behalf of the Plaintiffs without requiring that they should 
be personally obligated for the fees incurred. The Court finds Barker v. Utah Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n. No. 960080, 338 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 8 (Utah Mar. 3, 1998) dispositive on this issue 
which states as follows: 
Whether the attorneys provided their services pro bono, at a discount, or at full 
market rate does not effect a determination of reasonable attorney fees. See 
Blum v. Stenson. 465 U.S. 886, 895, 79 L. Ed. 2d 891, 104 S. Ct. 1541 
(1984); Ramos v. Lamm. 713 F.2d 546, 551 (10th Cir. 1983). Although both 
these cases concern a federal civil rights statute, the rationale that justifies their 
findings is the same: The rule instructs courts to consider the market rate for 
legal services, not to reduce the rates for pro bono services or reduced costs. 
See id. 
The Court having found no Utah law to the contrary, hereby finds that the mere fact 
that Plaintiffs' attorney agreed to perform his services pro bono but reserving his rights to seek 
an award of attorney's fees under the REPC does not effect a determination of reasonable 
attorney's fees. 
Next, this Court must determine whether Plaintiffs' attorney's fees are reasonable 
under the circumstances. In determining the reasonableness of requested attorney's fees the 
Court must answer the questions stated in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 989-90 
(Utah 1988), and set forth below: 
1. What legal work was actually performed? 
2. How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately 
prosecute the matter? 
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in 
the locality for similar services? 
4. Are there circumstances which require additional factors, including those 
listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility? 
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The last question set forth in Dixie State Bank is a catch-all question which may include 
any of the factors found in Rule 1.5 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, which reads as 
follows: 
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions 
involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular 
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained; 
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
(7) The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing 
the services; and 
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
In this case, Plaintiffs' Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs has not sufficiently 
addressed all of the questions listed in Dixie State Bank nor all of the factors found in Rule 1.5 
of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Therefore, Plaintiffs' attorney shall supplement 
his Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs to address the foregoing within 10 days of this 
Ruling. Upon receipt of Plaintiffs' attorney's Supplemental Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and 
Costs, the Defendants shall have 10 days to file a written objection. If an objection is filed, 
then the matter will be set for oral argument. 
Costs 
Pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "[e]xcept when express 
provision therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs. . . . " "Costs" 
as used above "means those fees which are required to be paid to the court and to witnesses, 
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and for which the statutes authorize to be included in the judgment." Frampton v. Wilson, 
605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980). Basically, the "trial court can exercise reasonable discretion 
in regard to the allowance of costs; and that it has a duty to guard against any excesses or 
abuses in the taxing thereof." LI 
The Plaintiffs claim that they are entided to their costs pursuant to paragraph 17 of the 
REPC which states that "[i]n any action arising out of this Contract, the prevailing party shall 
be entided to costs and reasonable attorney's fees." In the alternative, the Plaintiffs claim that 
they are entitled to their costs pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
At the outset, the Court finds that paragraph 17 of the REPC should not be read to allow more 
costs than is generally allowable under Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Therefore, whether the Plaintiffs rely on paragraph 17 of the REPC or Rule 54(d) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure for their claimed costs, the result will be the same. 
Defendants motion this Court to have the bill of costs taxed, pursuant to Rule 54(d)(2) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants claim that the costs claimed by the Plaintiffs 
which include service of process for depositions, courier services, phone/fax charges, 
photocopies, depositions, photographs, travel/mileage, and expert witness fees are not 
recoverable. In addition, Defendants claim that the Plaintiffs have not properly supported 
their claims for filing and jury fees, necessary service of process fees (not including deposition 
subpoenas) and witness fees. 
Utah courts have been somewhat inconsistent in determining just what costs are 
recoverable under Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court should 
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therefore carefully guard against any excesses or abuses of claimed costs. See Frampton v. 
Wilson 605 P.2d at 774. 
With respect to deposition costs, the party claiming them "has the burden of 
demonstrating that the depositions were reasonably necessary; determining whether that burden 
is met is within the sound discretion of the trial court." Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way 
Mktg.. Ltd.. 753 P.2d 507, 512 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Plaintiffs claim that all of the 
depositions taken were of witnesses at trial. In addition, the Plaintiffs used the depositions in 
the preparation of Plaintiffs cross examination. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have carried 
their burden to demonstrate that the deposition costs were reasonably necessary. 
With respect to service of depositions, "[t]he Utah Supreme Court has declined to 
extend the rule, which allows recovery of the cost of taking a deposition, to expenses such as 
service of a deposition." Id, Therefore, the Court finds that any service of depositions in this 
case are not taxable as costs. 
With respect to expert witness fees, "the courts hold that expert witnesses cannot be 
awarded extra compensation unless the statute expressly so provides." Frampton v. Wilson. 
605 P.2d at 774. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 21-5-4(1), "[e]very juror and witness legally 
required or in good faith requested to attend a trial court of record or not of record or a grand 
jury is entitled to $18.50 for the first day of attendance and $49 per day for each subsequent 
day of attendance. . . . " The Court finds that the Plaintiffs are only entitled to the statutory 
compensation provided in Utah Code Ann. § 21-5-4(1). 
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With respect to miscellaneous expenses such as models, photographs, and copies, they 
are generally not taxable as costs. See Frampton v. Wilson. 605 P.2d at 774. In addition, 
pre-litigation investigation, accountant fees, travel expenses, and lost personnel and secretarial 
time are generally not taxable as costs. See Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler. 768 
P.2d 950, 965 n.13 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The Court finds that the Plaintiffs are not entitled 
to miscellaneous expenses such as models, photographs, copies, pre-litigation investigation, 
accountant fees, travel expenses, and lost personnel and secretarial time. 
In conjunction with the Plaintiffs' Supplemental Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and 
Costs, the Plaintiffs shall supplement their Bill of Costs to be in conformity with the foregoing 
within 10 days of this Ruling. Upon receipt of Plaintiffs' Amended Bill of Costs, the 
Defendants shall have 10 days to file a written objection. If an objection is filed, then the 
matter will be set for oral argument. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court hereby rules as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees is GRANTED. The Plaintiffs' attorney shall 
supplement his Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs to address the issues in this Ruling 
within 10 days of this Ruling. Upon receipt of Plaintiffs' attorney's Supplemental Affidavit of 
Attorney's Fees and Costs, the Defendants shall have 10 days to file a written objection. If an 
objection is filed, then the matter will be set for oral argument. 
2. Defendants' Motion to Tax Costs is GRANTED. In conjunction with the Plaintiffs' 
Supplemental Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs, the Plaintiffs shall supplement their Bill 
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of Costs to be in conformity with the foregoing within 10 days of this Ruling. Upon receipt of 
Plaintiffs' Amended Bill of Costs, the Defendants shall have 10 days to file a written 
objection. If an objection is filed, then the matter will be set for oral argument. 
Counsel for Plaintiffs shall prepare an order consistent with the terms of this ruling and 
submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for 
signature, pursuant to Rule 4-5Q4 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
DATED this f ^ffy of April, 19^£r 
/k/ft M. kA^mG^SKf, JUDGE 
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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS, AND 
GRANTING DEFENDANTS'MOTION 
TO TAX COSTS 
Civil No. 970400584 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Plaindffs^otiorT^ and Costs, and Defendants' Motion to Tax 
Costs both came on for regularly scheduled hearing on April 6, 1999. Mark O. Morris appeared 
on behalf of Plaintiffs. Lance N. Long appeared on behalf of Defendants. After having reviewed 
the memoranda of law, affidavits, and other materials supplied to the court in connection with the 
foregoing motions, and after having entered rulings on said motions on April 7, 1999, and on 
April 23, 1999, and for good cause shown, 
The Court finds as follows: 
1. The Real Estate Purchase Contract at issue herein expressly provided for an award 
of a reasonable attorney's fee and costs to the prevailing party herein. 
2. Plaintiffs are the prevailing parties in this action. 
3. Paragraph 19 of the Real Estate Purchase Contract does not operate to bar plaintiffs' 
claim for attorney's fees and costs, for the reason that the Real Estate Purchase Contract called 
for performance by defendants Dan and Cynthia Parkinson of acts collateral to the mere 
conveyance of title. Hence the parties' obligations under the Real Estate Purchase Contract, 
including the obligation to pay a reasonable attorney's fees and costs in the event of a breach of 
a specific condition or term of said agreement, were not extinguished at closing. 
4. Because the Real Estate Purchase Agreement authorizes the payment of a reasonable 
attorney's fee to the prevailing parties, without more, this Court may and should make an award 
of reasonable attorney's fees, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiffs' counsel agreed to perform 
his services pro bono. 
5. Plaintiffs' counsel's Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs failed to describe with 
sufficient particularity those aspects required by Utah common law and Rule 1.5 of the Utah Rules 
of Professional Conduct. 
6. The only costs which shall be awarded to the plaintiffs herein are those allowed 
under Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2 
7. Plaintiffs carried their burden of demonstrating that deposition costs were 
reasonably necessary in this matter. 
8. Plaintiffs' are entitled to their deposition costs, filing fees, fees incurred for service 
of process upon the defendants herein, and statutory witness fees. 
9. As to the monies plaintiffs expended on courier services, phone and fax charges, 
photocopies, photographs and travel expense those shall not be awarded as costs herein. 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and 
Costs is granted in part and denied in part, and Defendants' Motion to Tax Costs is granted. It 
is further Ordered that Plaintiffs shall have until May 3, 1999 to submit a Supplemental Affidavit 
of Attorney's Fees, and an Amended Bill of Costs, both which shall conform with this Court's 
rulings of April 7, 1999 and April 23, 1999. 
DATED this )> 2 <fay of May, 1999. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
HILL, HARRISON, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
'*'~+t*t*" 
Stephen Quesenberry 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Granting 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorneys's Fees and Costs, and Granting Defendants' Motion to 
Tax Costs to be served via facsimile on the 3rd day of May, 1999, to: 
Stephen Quesenberry, Esq. 
HILL, HARRISON, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
3319 North University Ave., Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
-ML 
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Case No. 970400584 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs Second 
Supplemental Affidavit for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs. The Court has reviewed the 
file, the memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral arguments, and being fully advised in the 
premises, hereby issues the following: 
RULING 
"Attorney fees may only be awarded if authorized by statute or contract." Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracey. 781 P.2d 414, 419-20 (Utah 1989). "However, regardless of 
whether the basis for an award of fees is contractual or statutory, only a reasonable fee may be 
recovered." Id at 420. This Court in its Ruling dated April 7, 1999, granted the Plaintiffs 
their reasonable attorney's fees and costs based on paragraph 17 of the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract. However, the Court did not determine the reasonableness of the attorney's fees and 
costs expended. 
This Court must now determine whether Plaintiffs' attorney's fees and costs are 
reasonable under the circumstances. In determining the reasonableness of requested attorney's 
fees the Court must answer the questions stated in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 
989-90 (Utah 1988), and set forth below: 
1. What legal work was actually performed? 
2. How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately 
prosecute the matter? 
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in 
the locality for similar services? 
4. Are there circumstances which require additional factors, including those 
listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility? 
There was extensive legal work performed by both parties in this case. This legal work 
included the following: initiating a law suit for breach of the Purchase Agreement, breach of 
Improvement Agreement, misrepresentation by omission, and breach of Real Estate Statutes; 
amended complaints were filed; discovery conducted; correspondence between counsel; 
settlement negotiations; mediation; preparation for a jury trial; a five-day jury trial; and post 
trial motions. In particular, a Complaint, an Amended Complaint, a Second Amended 
Complaint, an Answer, numerous depositions and other discovery, a Continuance because of 
new counsel on the part of the Defendant, a response to Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgement, a response to Defendant's Motion in Limine, numerous hearings for oral 
arguments, a Proposed Trial Plan, a five day jury trial, and numerous post trial motions. 
Every hearing and the trial held before this Court required counsel for the Plaintiffs to travel 
from Salt Lake County to Utah County. 
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The work performed by Plaintiffs' counsel was reasonably necessary to prosecute the 
matter. The Plaintiffs initiated this action against the Defendants for breach of the Purchase 
Agreement, breach of Improvement Agreement, misrepresentation by omission, and breach of 
Real Estate Statutes. The Plaintiffs bore the burden or proof throughout the trial of these 
issues. The pleadings and hearings referred to above appear reasonably necessary under the 
circumstances. Although not extremely complicated, this litigation was very fact intensive and 
required the use of numerous experts. 
Plaintiffs' counsels' billing rates are consistent with the rate customarily charged in the 
locality. Mark Morris is billing at the rate of $190.00 per hour. He is an experienced 
litigator with the law firm of Snell & Wilmer. He has more than 14 years experience and is 
admitted to practice before the Federal District Courts of Utah and Arizona, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth and Ninth Circuits, and the U.S. Supreme Court. Mark Morris' billing 
rate of $190.00 per hour is consistent with rates customarily charged in this locality for an 
attorney of his credentials and experience. Therefore, Mark Morris' billing rates of $190.00 
per hour is fair and reasonable under the circumstances. 
Both Dan Garrison, an associate with Snell & Wilmer and Adrianne Goldsmith, a 
summer associate worked briefly on this case. Dan Garrison bills at the rate of $130.00 per 
hour. Adrianne Goldsmith bills at the rate of $70.00 per hour. Both Dan Garrison and 
Adrianne Goldsmith billing rates are consistent with rates customarily charged in this locality 
for associates of their credentials and experience. Therefore, both Dan Garrison's and 
Adrianne Goldsmith's billing rates are fair and reasonable under the circumstances. 
Ruling Page 3 
The last question set forth in Dixie State Bank is a catch-all question which may include 
any of the factors found in Rule 1.5 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, which reads as 
follows: 
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions 
involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular 
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained; 
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
(7) The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing 
the services; and 
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
The aforementioned factors have factors within factors and were extremely important in 
assessing the reasonableness of the attorney's fees requested and each will be discussed in 
some detail. 
First, the time and labor required by this case was extensive, as has been previously 
mentioned. The week of jury trial required around the clock preparation and attention of all 
the attorneys involved in this case. This case involved numerous issues, it required the use of 
extensive expert testimony by both parties, and was extremely fact sensitive. Finally, the 
claims in this case required the attorney for the Plaintiffs to be a skilled litigator so as to fetter 
out all the facts and issues in order to perform the legal services properly and to carry the 
burden of proof in this case. 
Second, since the inception of this case, it was likely that the acceptance of this case 
would preclude other employment for Mark Morris, even though this case involved his family. 
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It is likely that the attorneys for both sides were aware that a jury trial would be the final result 
given the polarity of the respective parties positions. Also, that extensive discovery would 
need to be completed, that motions would need to be filed and briefed and that extensive 
preparation for a jury trial would need to take place. The foregoing would clearly preclude the 
attorneys involved in this case from accepting other employment. 
Third, this Court finds that the attorney's fees requested are consistent with the fees 
customarily charged in this locality for similar legal services. This Court gave full 
consideration to the following: the specialized nature of this litigation, the claims involved and 
the counter-claims involved, the time and labor required, the time constraints imposed by the 
Court and the expertise necessary to both prosecute and defend the claims involved. This 
Court believes that any law firm capable of trying a case such as this, would have incurred 
attorney's fees in a similar amount as requested in this case. 
Fourth, the amount involved in this case from the outset was approximately 
$150,000.00 with the possibility of an award of costs and attorney's fees. The Plaintiffs were 
successful on all of their claims, except their misrepresentation by omission and the jury 
awarded a verdict in the amount of $57,012.00. 
Fifth, there were time limitations imposed by the Court. This case was subject to a 
Scheduling Order, which the Court enforced. In addition, much of the attorney's fees 
expended were within the closing months before trial after the settlement negotiations had not 
proved fruitful. 
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Sixth, the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client had little or 
no effect on this Court's task of determining the reasonableness of the attorney's fees 
requested. However, the nature and length of the personal relationship with the client was 
extensive, since they are brothers. Counsel for Plaintiffs affirmed in his affidavit that his 
client performed many of the tasks of a paralegal, but without compensation. 
Seventh, the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney's involved was discussed 
in detail above. 
Eighth, counsel for the Plaintiffs performed his services on a contingent fees basis. If 
the Plaintiffs were successful, he would attempt to collect under the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract. However, if the Plaintiffs claims were unsuccessful, then he would not collect. This 
arrangement fostered frugality and conservative use of his time. 
Finally, the Plaintiffs have met the requirements of Brown v. David K. Richards & 
Co.. No. 971536, 366 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah Ct. App. April 8, 1999). Specifically, the 
Plaintiffs have set forth the "(1) successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to 
attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an entitled to attorney 
fees had the claims been successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement to 
attorney fees." IcL at 30. The Plaintiffs in this case were successful in their Breach of 
Purchase Agreement and are entitled to attorney's fees for such claim. The Plaintiffs were not 
successful on their misrepresentation by omission claims. The Plaintiffs were not entitled to 
attorney's fees for their Breach of Improvement Agreement and their Breach of Real Estate 
Statutes claims. 
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Therefore, upon answering the questions set forth in Dixie State Bank, and utilizing the 
factors set forth in Rule 1.5. of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, this Court finds 
Plaintiffs' requested attorney's fees are fair and reasonable under the circumstances of this 
case. Therefore, this Court grants the Plaintiffs their attorney's fees in the sum of $48,567.00 
which is the attorney's fees expended in prosecuting the Breach of Purchase Agreement claim 
and such additional reasonable attorney's fees as are incurred for the collection of said 
judgment. In addition this Court grants the Plaintiffs their costs in the sum of $4,446.31. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court hereby rules as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs are awarded their attorney's fees in the sum of $48,567.00 and such 
additional reasonable attorney's fees as are incurred for the collection of said judgment. 
2. Plaintiffs are awarded their costs in the sum of $4,446.31. 
3. Counsel for Plaintiffs shall prepare an order consistent with the terms of this ruling and 
submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for 
signature, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
DATED this of July, 1999. 
Z. M. HARDING<JR., JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify th£t I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling with postage 
prepaid thereon this )J_ day of July, 1999, to the following: 
Mark O. Morris 
SNELL & WJXMER L.L.P-
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-5225 
Stephen Quesenberry 
Lance N. Long 
HILL, HARRISON, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
3319 North University Ave., Suite 200 
Provo, UT 84604 




IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL MORRIS; ELIZABETH ] 
MORRIS; and JOHN COVEY, ] 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ] 
DAN PARKINSON; CYNTHIA ; 
PARKINSON; LINDA HATCH; and ; 
GUY HATCH, ; 
Defendant. ) 
) JURY VERDICT 
> Civil No. 970400584 
> Judge Ray Harding Jr. 
We the jury in the above entitled action find as follows: 
1. With regard to the claim of Michael and Elizabeth Morris against Dan and Cynthia 
Parkinson for breach of contract, we find for: 
(Choose one) 
X the Plaintiffs (Michael and Elizabeth Morris) 
the Defendants (Dan and Cynthia Parkinson) 
2. With regard to the claim of Michael and Elizabeth Morris against Guy Hatch for 
intentional or negligent misrepresentation, we find for: 
(Choose one) 
the Plaintiffs (Michael and Elizabeth Morris) 
X the Defendant (Guy Hatch) 
3. a. If you find for the Plaintiffs Micheal and Elizabeth Morris on any of the claims 
listed in items 1-2 above, what amount do you find will compensate them for the 
damages they suffered? 
l j ^ ) ^ £0 > QQ (write in the total amount of damages), 
b. Of the total amount in line 3.a. above, how much do find should be paid to the 
Morrises by: 
$ H<>f ;>£&. °d Dan and Cynthia Parkinson for breach of contract, 
V Guy Hatch for misrepresentation by omission. 
(Total of these two lines must equal the total amount of damages from line 
3.a. above.) 
4. With regard to the claim of John Covey against Linda Hatch for breach of contract, we 
find for: 
(Choose one) 
X the Plaintiff (John Covey) 
the Defendant (Linda Hatch) 
(If you find for the plaintiff, John Covey, also complete the following): 
it c- —^  
We award damages to the Plaintiff, John Covey, in the amount of *** 0 , 0 0 0 - . 
5. With regard to the claim of Michael and Elizabeth Morris against Guy Hatch for 
violation of real estate agency statutes, we find for: 
(Choose one) 
X the Plaintiffs (Michael and Elizabeth Morris) 
the Defendant (Guy Hatch) 
(If you find for the plaintiffs, Michael and Elizabeth Morris, also complete the 
following): 
We award damages to the Plaintiffs Michael and Elizabeth Morris in the amount of 
DATED this &Xp day of January, 1999. 
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STEPHEN QUESENBERRY (8073) 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ P.C. 
Jamestown Square 
3319 North University Avenue, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801)375-6600 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL MORRIS; ELIZABETH ; 
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vs. 
DAN PARKINSON; CYNTHIA 




) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
) JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
) VERDICT, OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, 
) FOR NEW TRIAL 
) Civil No. 970400584 
) Judge Ray Harding Jr. 
Defendants, through Stephen E. Quesenberry, HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, 
counsel of record, and, pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 50 and 59, hereby move the 
Court for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, for a new trial. 
This motion is supported by the Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted 
herewith. 
DATED this 19th day of August, 1999. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
STEPHEN pJESENBERRY 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
2?X The undersigned hereby certifies that on the / / day of August, 1999 they caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing to be delivered to the following: 
MarkO. Morris, Esq. 
SNELL & WILMER L.L. P. 
I l l East Broadway, Suite 900 




Mailed (postage pre-paid) 
Mark 0. Morris (4636) 
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P. 
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1004 
Telephone: (801) 237-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 237-1950 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL MORRIS, ELIZABETH 
MORRIS and JOHN COVEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DAN PARKINSON, CYNTHIA 
PARKINSON, LINDA HATCH, GUY 
HATCH,, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
FOR A NEW TRIAL 
Honorable Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Case No. 970400584 
Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or, in the Alternative For 
a New Trial, came before the Court for a regularly scheduled hearing at 1:00 p.m. on October 28, 
1999. Mark O. Morris appeared on behalf of plaintiffs. Stephen Quesenberry appeared on 
behalf of defendants. After considering the memoranda filed by the parties and hearing Oral 
Argument, and after reviewing all relevant evidence and all reasonable inferences from that 
evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, this Court finds that the jury verdict finding 
Linda Hatch liable to John Covey for $5,000 and finding Guy Hatch liable to Michael and 
Elizabeth Morris in the amount of $9,792 is supported by the record herein. Further, this Court 
again rejects the defendants' claim that the doctrine of caveat emptor precludes some or any of 
plaintiffs claims herein. Accordingly, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's Motion for Judgment Nothwithstanding the 
Verdict, or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial is hereby denied. 
Snell&WilmerL.L.p. / 
Ma±OJW5ms 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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STEPHEN QUESENBERRY (8073) 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ L.C. 
Jamestown Square 
3319 North University Avenue, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801)375-6600 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL MORRIS; ELIZABETH 
MORRIS; and JOHN COVEY, ; 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, ] 
DAN PARKINSON; CYNTHIA 
PARKINSON; LINDA HATCH; and ] 
GUY HATCH, ) 
Defendants and Appellants. ' 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
• Civil No. 970400584 
i Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
COMES NOW the defendants, by and through their attorney of record, and hereby 
submits their Notice of Appeal to this Court as follows: 
(1) Notice is hereby given that Defendants and appellants, Dan Parkinson, Cynthia 
Parkinson, Linda Hatch, and Guy Hatch, through counsel, Stephen Quesenberry of Hill, Johnson 
& Schmutz, appeal to the Utah Supreme Court the final judgment, denial of summary judgment, 
FILE" IN 4TH DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNT* 
to 23 4 os PH '99 
Copy 
i 
and post trial rulings of the Honorable Ray Harding Jr. entered in this matter on November 3, 
1999 (final rulings on post-trial motions) and earlier. 
(2) The appeal is taken from the entire judgment entered in this matter, including but 
not limited to the following: denial of Defendants' motion for summary judgment, denial of 
Defendants' motions for directed verdicts and JNOV, denial of Defendants' post-trial motions, 
the verdict entered after trial, and various evidentiary issues including jury instructions, motions 
in limine, evidentiary rulings, etc. 
DATED this 29th day of November, 1999. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed and faxed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of 
Appeal, postage prepaid, on this of November, 1999, to the following: 
Mark 0. Morris, Esq. 
Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
801-237-1950 facsimile y£JMA&tfh^ 
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Mark 0. Morris, Esq. (A4636) 
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P. 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-5225 
Telephone: (801) 237-1900 
Facsimile: (801)237-1950 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL MORRIS, ELIZABETH 
MORRIS and JOHN COVEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DAN PARKINSON, CYNTHIA 





Civil No. 970400584 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ELIZABETH MORRIS, being first duly sworn, hereby avers that she is over 18 years of age, 
she has personal knowledge of the following facts and is competent to testify as to their truth: 
1. I am one of the plaintiffs in the above action. 
2. I executed the final Addendum to that certain Real Estate Purchase Contract which 
is attached to the December 15, 1998 Affidavit of Stephen Quesenberry. 
3. When my husband and I first began looking to purchase the residence located at 9 
North Meadowbrook Drive in Alpine, Utah, and after observing its incomplete condition, it was 
always my understanding that the home was not yet complete, and that we were purchasing it as 
a new home. 
4. As we walked around the home and inspected it prior to making our offer on the 
home, we observed a number of areas in the home that were not yet finished, were in poor 
condition, or were in need of repair. 
5. At the time that we submitted the earnest money offer set forth in the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract on August 22, 1995, my husband and I included in that offer our requirement 
that the Sellers would warrant the homefs quality, workmanship, habitability, systems of all kinds, 
and the roof on the home for a period of two years following our purchase of the home. 
6. Our reason for insisting upon that warranty was based upon the fact that the home 
was in an uncomplete condition, it was new, and because a number of the conditions in and around 
the home concerned us regarding the quality, workmanship, and habitability of the home. We also 
knew that many problems or potential problems in the house would not be apparent to us until we 
had lived in it for some time. 
7. Included among, but not limited to, the items which we observed at the home and 
which gave us concern regarding purchase of the home were the following: 
2 
a. The precarious nature of the circular stairway; 
b. The condition and structure of the interior door frames; 
c. The existence of only one furnace in the home; 
d. The existence of only one air conditioning unit; 
e. The existence of crevices and cracks in a number of the window frames; 
f. The placement of the rear deck over the window wells on the West side; 
g. The unfinished nature of landscaping around the home; and 
h. The absence of base trim in the kitchen and kitchen cabinets, and the poor 
quality of all visible finish work, including a lack of a final coat of paint, lack of final 
wood floor coating, holes in the walls in need of patchwork, and lack of a final cabinet 
plan. 
8. As a result of the inspections that we performed on the home, we expressly 
conditioned our purchase of the home upon a promise by the Seller to perform all of the work that 
is set forth on the August 22, 1995 Addendum to the Real Estate Purchase Contract. Those 
conditions included a two year warranty by Sellers as to quality, workmanship, and habitability 
of the home. 
9. We included the above language in the Contract because we wanted to make certain 
that the home that we were purchasing, which was in an unfinished state, would be brought up to 
code, and would be completed in a workmanlike and quality condition, consistent with the amount 
of money we were paying for the home and other contractual requirements I obtained through my 
father, John Covey. 
3 
10. By wording the warranty as we did, to include quality, workmanship, habitability, 
systems of all kinds, and the roof, it was our desire to make the warranty as broad as we possibly 
could, given the nature of the many defects we observed in the home at the time we agreed to 
purchase it. 
11. Subsequent to purchasing the home, we learned from the Alpine City Building 
Inspector that no Certificate of Occupancy has ever been issued on our home. 
12. At the time we purchased the home, we considered the home as "new," in spite of 
the fact that Guy Hatch and his family had been living there, because it was not yet completed and 
he indicated he was the builder and would be moving to another home he was in the process of 
building. 
13. Prior to the time that I signed the August 22, 1995 Real Estate Purchase Contract, 
I obtained a promise from Guy Hatch that he would complete a number of items on the home in 
connection with the purchase of the home. It was Guy Hatch's desire that the agreement for this 
be set forth in a separate contract, to be signed by his wife, Linda, and by my father, John Covey, 
who was going to advance the additional $25,000 for the added work. 
14. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a copy of the agreement between Linda Hatch and 
John Covey, which includes a number of items that I wanted to have been performed subsequent 
to our purchase of the home. 
4 
15. The "plan" that is set forth in paragraph 7 of the attached contract hereto included 
repainting and performing other improvements to the home to bring it up to the new and complete 
condition for which we had bargained when we made the offer on the home. 
Dated this W day of January, 1999. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ^ - day of January, 1999. 
• ^*tX >ar^» 
Public 
My Commission Expires: Residing At: Salt Lake City, Utah 
Notary Public • 
W. BRIAN HULS3 | 
111 E Broadway Sta C 3 \ 
Salt Lata City, Utah 84 n1 \ 
My Commission Expires • 
November 14, 1993 I 
Stela of Utah j 
5 
I do hereby declare that on this 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
4 day of January, 1999,1 caused to be mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVITOFELIZABETHMORRIS to the following: 
Stephen Quesenberry, Esq. 
HILL, HARRISON, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
3319 North University Ave., Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 




Design and Decor: 
For the sum total of twenty five thousand dollars ($25,000.) agrees to provide materials' 
and consultation for the decorating of a house at 9 North Meadowbrook Drive in the city; 
of Alpine, Utah for Elizabeth Morris. 
Included in this price is the following: 
LInstall sub-zero refrgerator w/ cabinetry. 
2. Install new double oven and-cookroj)w/ cabinetry. 
3. Landscape rear yard with sod and sprinkler. 
4. Windows washed inside and out 
5. Carpets steam-cleaned.' 
6. Add additional electric as needed for appliances. 
7.JDecorate as per plan. 
in the event that Elizabeth Morris is unable to close escrow and buy the house at Meadow-1" 
brook Drive, the funds will be refunded to her father, John Covey within thirty days of. 
notice. 
LINDA HATCH DATE JQffrl COVEY C J DATE 
Mark 0. Morris, Esq. (A4636) 
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P. 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-5225 
Telephone: (801) 237-1900 
Facsimile: (801)237-1950 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL MORRIS, ELIZABETH 
MORRIS and JOHN COVEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DAN PARKINSON, CYNTHIA 





Civil No. 970400584 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
MICHAEL MORRIS, being first duly sworn, hereby avers that he is over 18 years of age, 
he has personal knowledge of the following facts and is competent to testify as to their truth: 
1. I am one of the plaintiffs in the above action. 
2 DEPENDANT' 
f BMOT 
2. I executed the final Addendum to that certain Real Estate Purchase Contract which 
is attached to the December 15, 1998 Affidavit of Stephen Quesenberry. 
3. In the summer of 1995, when my wife and I first began looking to purchase the 
residence located at 9 North Meadowbrook Drive in Alpine, Utah, and after observing its 
complete condition, it was always my understanding that the home was not yet complete, and that 
we were purchasing it as a new home. 
4. As we walked around the home and inspected it prior to making our offer on the 
home, we observed a number of areas in the home that were not yet finished, were in poor 
condition, or were in need of repair. 
5. At the time that we submitted the earnest money offer set forth in the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract on August 22, 1995, my wife and I included in that offer our requirement that 
the Sellers would warrant the home's quality, workmanship, habitability, systems of all kinds, and 
the roof on the home for a period of two years following our purchase of the home. 
6. Our reason for insisting upon that warranty was based upon the fact that the home 
was in an incomplete condition, it was new, and because a number of the conditions in and around 
the home concerned us regarding the quality, workmanship, and habitability of the home. We also 
knew that many problems or potential problems in the home would not be apparent to us until we 
had lived in it. 
7. Included among, but not limited to, the items which we observed at the home and 
which gave us concern regarding purchase of the home were the following: 
a. The grade and slope of the area on both sides of the home; 
b. The precarious nature of the circular stairway; 
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c. The condition and structure of the interior door frames; 
d. The existence of only one furnace in the home; 
e. The existence of only one air conditioning unit; 
f. The drop of the stair from the home into the garage; 
g. The placement of the rear deck over the window wells on the West side; 
h. The unfinished nature of landscaping around the home; and 
i. The absence of base trim in the kitchen and kitchen cabinets, and the poor 
quality of all visible finish work. 
8. As a result of the inspections that we performed on the home, we expressly 
conditioned our purchase of the home upon a promise by the Seller to perform all of the work that 
is set forth on the August 22, 1995 Addendum to the Real Estate Purchase Contract. Those 
conditions included a two year warranty by Sellers as to quality, workmanship, and habitability 
of the home. The warranty was negotiated, as the Sellers originally wanted the warranty to be for 
only a one year period. We rejected that proposal. 
9. We included the above language in the Contract because we wanted to make certain 
that the home that we were purchasing, which was in an unfinished state, would be completed 
according to code, would be completed in a workmanlike and quality manner, and would address 
hidden and latent defects that would manifest themselves as we lived in the home, consistent with 
the amount of money we were paying for the home. 
10. By wording the warranty as we did, to include quality, workmanship, habitability, 
systems of all kinds, and the roof, it was our desire to make the warranty as broad as we possibly 
could, given the nature of the many defects we observed in the home, and the potential for latent 
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defects, at the time we agreed to purchase it. 
11. Subsequent to purchasing the home, we learned from the Alpine City Building 
Inspector that no Certificate of Occupancy has ever been issued on our home. 
12. At the time we purchased the home, we considered the home as "new," in spite of 
the fact that Guy Hatch and his family had been living there, because it was not yet complete and 
he indicated he was the builder, and he would be moving to another home he was in the process 
of building. ^ 
lis $ J day of Dated thi   f  f January, 1999 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4& day of January, 1999. 
^fe->->3»^ JZ. 
Nptary Public 
My Commission Expires: K.esiding At: Salt Lake City, Utah 
Notary Pub's y 
W. BRIAN HULC- 3 
111 E. Broadway S:o. f < g 
Salt Lake City, Utah C4,.i J 
My Commission Ex:7::.; i 
November 14.19.3 1 
State of Utah j 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby declare that on this i day of January, 1999,1 caused to be mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL MORRIS to the following: 
Stephen Quesenberry, Esq. 
HILL, HARRISON, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
3319 North University Ave., Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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